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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when
it found the defendant competent to stand trial?
II.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when,

after the trial court appointed counsel, it allowed defendant to
act as his own counsel in certain respects, and when it allowed
defendant to withdraw the insanity and/or diminished capacity
defenses?
III.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4(2) strictly, thereby
allowing a mentally ill (and statutorily insane) defendant to
discard the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity or
diminished capacity?
IV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when
it failed to allow the defendant to represent himself?
V.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it denied the defendant's motion for change of venue?
VI.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it excluded jurors who expressed a reluctance to impose the death
penalty or it failed to exclude those who expressed an eye for an
eye, tooth for a tooth attitude concerning imposition of the
death penalty, thus violating defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights?
VII.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it allowed individuals who indicated that they had formed an
opinion that the defendant was guilty to remain as prospective
1

jurors, thus requiring defendant use peremptory challenges to
exclude those who should have been excused for cause?
VIII.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error

when it failed to give requested voir dire questions concerning
knowledge of Dan Lafferty's conviction and its effect on
prospective jurors?
IX.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it followed the procedure of death-qualifying and, thus, allowed
a jury to be impanelled which was predisposed to conviction?
X. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when
it allowed the prosecution, during both the trial and the penalty
phase, to make statements that called attention to matters which
the jury would not have been justified in considering and which
were unfairly prejudicial to the defendant?
XI.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it admitted photographs of the homicide victims which were unduly
prejudicial and not probative of essential facts?
XII.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it admitted a color video recording of the homicide scene which
was unduly prejudicial, cumulative and calculated to inflame the
passions of the jurors?
XIII.

Do Utah's sentencing proceedings for capital

felony cases violate due process when the statutory aggravating
factors, which are necessary elements of the capital crime, are
also the aggravating factors considered by the jury in
determining whether to impose the death sentence?
2

XIV.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it excluded evidence proferred by defense counsel designed to
establish mitigating factors?
XV.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it allowed evidence regarding factors in aggravation/ in addition
to the statutory factors set forth in the jury instructions?
XVI.

Based upon the evidence introduced at the penalty

hearing, could reasonable minds have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors totally
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and
appropriate in these circumstances?
XVII.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error

when it allowed hearsay and liearsay upon hearsay evidence at the
penalty hearing?
XVIII.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error

when it instructed the jury that they could consider any evidence
which had been admitted in the guilt portion of the trial, in
addition to those admitted in the penalty portion?
XIX.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment?
XX.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when

it allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of both
capital homicide and the inchoate crime of conspiracy?

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Ronald Watson Lafferty was charged with the
commission of two capital felonies involving the death of Brenda
Lafferty, a sister-in-law, and a niece, Erica Lafferty.

The

homicides were alleged to have occurred on the 24th of July,
1984.

The defendant was also charged with committing two

aggravated burglaries and two counts of conspiracy to commit
capital homicide, all of which are first-degree felonies alleged
to have been committed the same day. (See Addendum, Exhibit 1.)
The preliminary hearing was held on the 10th and 11th
of September, 1984 at which the defendant represented himself.
(P..3)

Defendant was bound over, with all charges, to the Fourth

Judicial District Court for arraignment.
On September 21, 1984, defendant was arraigned before
Judge George E. Ballif, at which time the defendant declined to
enter a plea upon the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction.
Judge Ballif entered a plea of not guilty to all counts on behalf
of defendant. (P..63)

The case was assigned to Judge J. Robert

Bullock for trial to begin on October 29, 1984.
On the 27th of September, 1984, the prosecuting
attorney, Wayne B. Watson, on behalf of the State filed a
petition to determine competency of the defendant. (R.64-68)
Hearing on the petition was held on September ?&, 1984, at which
time the defendant represented himself.

The court issued

an order appointing two alienists to examine the defendant and
submit written reports to the court.
4

On October 23, 1984 the trial court held a hearing to
determine the competency of the defendant to proceed.

At the

hearing, the defendant and his co-defendant, Dan Charles
Lafferty, represented themselves (as they had at the preliminary
hearing and the arraignment) by calling their own witnesses,
cross-examining the expert witnesses and responding to the
questions of the court.

(See Addendum, Exhibit 2, pp. 52-60,)

The evidence introduced consisted of written reports
from expert witnesses Dr. Jess Groesbeck and Dr. Phillip
Washburn, as well as Dr. Washburn's oral testimony, and the
testimony of serveral lay witnesses called by the defendants,
including Noall T. Wootton, the county attorney, Wayne Watson,
deputy county attorney, two circuit court judges, one district
court judge, and several of the defendants1 acquaintances.

Based

upon the evidence set forth in this hearing, the trial court
concluded that the defendants were not incompetent to proceed.
(See Addendum, Exhibit 2, p. 147.)
Shortly after the October 23, 1984 hearing, a second
petition for inquiry as to the competency of the defendant was
filed by Lt. Jerry Scott of the Utah County Sheriff's Department,
in charge of the Utah County Jail, wherein the defendant had been
held.

This petition alleged that the defendant had been observed

by Lt. Scott to act in such a fashion that he did not appear to
be in control of his faculties.

(See Addendum, Exhibit 3.)

Defendant was ordered to the Utah State Hospital for an
evaluation.
5

Four doctors completed the ordered evaluation and
submitted a letter report to the court.

The report, signed by

Dr. Van Austin, forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Robert J. Howell,
clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Peter Heinbecher,
Clinical Director of Forensic Psychiatry and Dr. Jess Groesbeck,
Medical Director of the Utah State Hospital, concluded that the
defendant was competent to stand trial.

They found that he did

not suffer from a mental disease or defect, that he had the
ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings agair^t bin,
and that he had the ability to assist counsel in his deferse.
(See Addendum, Exhibit 4.)

A subsequent competency hearirg

was then held, at the conclusion of which the court found the
defendant competent to proceed.

The trial date was set for the

first week of January, 1985.
On October 27, 1984 the trial court, on its ovvn
initiative, appointed the law firm of Aldrich, Nelson, Weight &
Esplin as counsel for the defendant, Ronald Watson Lafferty
(R.135).

Michael D. Esp]in and Gary E. Weight, at the request of

both the defendant and his co-defendant, filed their motion to
withdraw (R.140) on October 30, 1984 and filed their memorandum
in support thereof (R.154-167) one day later.
On December 4, 1984 Richard E. Johnson (hereinafter
referred to as defense counsel) entered his appearance as
attorney of record for the defendant (R.196) and replaced Michael
D. Esplin and Gary H. Weight.

Defense counsel filed a notice of

insanity and/or diminished capacity on behalf of the defendant on
6

that same day (P..194) .
On December 29, 1984 the defendant attempted to hang
himself in his cell at the Utah County ceil.

He was found

unconscious with no heart beat; he had also stopped breathing.
On December 31, 1984, a motion to sever the trials of
Dan Charles Lafferty and the defendant, based upon the
defendant's January 29, 1984 attempted suicide, was granted
(P.263).

By order of the court, dated that sane day, tie

defendant's brother, Dan ci'-a/T^s Lafferty, vas allowed to
represent himself in his trial, which was set for January 3,
1985, so long as he followed court procedure and protocol.
However, the appointment of Richard E. Johnson as counsel for the
defendant was confirmed and continued until further order of the
court (P.256-58).
On Jcruajy 2, 1985 a petition to determine the
competency of the defendant was filed by the State of Utah
(R.266).

Due to the suicide attempt, the possibility of brair

damage, the results of the EEC, an apparent memory loss and
difficulties in motor control, it was determined by the court
that another competency evaluation should be done.

Accordingly,

the defendant was admitted to the Utah State Hospital for a
second evaluation on January 2, 1985.

This evaluation was

completed by the same team of court-appointed specialists who had
evaluated the defendant in November.
The reports submitted by this panel of experts found
the defendant (1) lacking the ability to comprehend the nature of
7

the charges against him and the punishment specified for the
offense charged and (2) lacking the ability to either
meaningfully assist his counsel in his defense or to
realistically conduct his own defense.
5.)

(See Addendum, Exhibit

The trial court found the defendant incompetent to

proceed and ordered him hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital.
On March IP, 1985 an additional report was submitted to
the court by the same panel of experts.

The ooctois found that

the defendant suffered from a mental illness which involved a
paranoid delusional system which had generalized to the entire
judicial system and severely impaired his ability to understand
and interpret reality.

The alienists also found the defendant

suffering from amnestic syndrome, secondary tc encephalopathy
caused by the hanging attempt, in addition to the paranoia.
The doctors found that, although) the defendant had a
factual understanding of the proceedings, he did not have a
rational understanding or ability to assist counsel or aid in his
defense, nor could he conduct his own defense.

(See Addendum,

Exhibit 6.)
Following the receipt of the doctors1 report, a
hearing was held on April 2, 1985.

At that hearing Dr. Howell,

Dr. Austin and Dr. Groesbeck testified as per their written
report.

The only other witness to testify was Dr. Eugene Thcrne,

who had not examined the defendant.

Dr. Thorne had been retained

by the State.
On £pril 8, 1985 the -trial court issued its memorandum
8

decision, finding that the defendant was rot mentally J]l, as
defined in Utah Code Ann. £ £4-7-28(1), 'as amended,
Addendum, Exhibit 7.)

(See

As far as present counsel can

determine, the court never made any ruling subsequent to this
memorandum regarding the defendant's sanity.
On the next day, April 9, 1985, the court, vie a
telephone hearing, determined that the defendant did not intend
to further cooperaie v-itb the doctors regarding evaluations of
his sanity (R.898-904).

On that same day defense counsel filed

an affidavit stating that the defendant wished to introduce
testimony from doctors who had previously tested the defendant
(R.519-520). At that time defense counsel also renewed his motion
to reassert the insanity or diminished capacity defense.
Defense counsel, at the request of the defendant,
renewed his motion to withdraw as appointed counsel (R.507) and
filed a memorandum in support of his renewed motion to withdraw
(R.496-506) on April 23, 1985.

Defendant had been advised of the

ramifications of self-representation at every stage of the
proceedings, including the preliminary hearing, the arraignment
(R.912-917), at the close of the first competency hearing on
October 24, 1984, and at several other junctures.

The position

of the defendant remained consistent, in that he continually
asserted his desire to represent himself.

(See Addendum, Exhibit

2, p. 4.)
Defense counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney of
record and his motion to reassert the insanity or diminished
9

capacity defense were denied on ApriJ ?4, 1985 (F.570).
The trial began on April 25, 1985 with voir dire
examination of the jurors and ended on Kay 7, 1985 with the
jury's decision that the defendant should receive the death
penalty.
Jury qualification began the morning of April 75, 3 985
and continued until ApriJ 27, ]985 at 12:30 p«r.t

r«i n'ro tlis two-

and-a-half day process, sixty-nine jurors were questioned
relative to their knowledge regarding the case, their
backgrounds, whether they had formed an opinion regarding the
case, and their feelings about the death penalty.

(P..992-164C)

Additionally, sorre jurors were questioned about their knowledge
of the trial of Dan Charles Laffer\.\ , ticther and alleged
co-conspirator of the defendant.

At the end of this procedure,

forty jurors were qualified, fror< which a jury of twelve was
selected.
During the trial proceedings, defense counsel
participated fully before the jury, clearly representing the
defendant individually and not as co-counsel, advisory counsel or
standby counsel.

At the beginning of the trial the court stated,

"The defendant is present with his counsel, Mr. Richard Johnson."
(R.992-993, 1692)
Although the court had indicated that the defendant
could participate as much as he desired, defense counsel found it
necessary to object to the court's exclusion of the defendant
during arguments in chambers on motions (R.1657).
10

The court, as

c rule, treated defense counsel, Richard F. Johnson, as the
person determining the course of the defense in his remarks
before the jury throughout the trial and related proceedings.
During the trial defense counsel indicated to the court
that the defendant did not agree with the wa^ counsel was
presenting the defense (R.2466).

In fact, 1 he defendant

prevented defense counsel, in the midst of one witness1
testimony, from questioning that witness further.

(R.2456)

The

trial court had advised defense counsel that he could argue
whatever he wanted to argue to the jury (R.2457); however, when
counsel argued a particular defense to the jury during his
closing statement, the defendant disagreed with his Jine of
argument and told him to "wind it up." (R.2507-252C)
An in camera hearing prior to the sentencing phase of
the trial was held on May 6, 19C5 in the cleared courtroom
(R.2527-2536).

A video tape of the crime scene was shown after

the prosecution indicated its intent to show the tape to the
jury.

After viewing the tape, defense counsel objected to the

prejudicial nature of the tape, because its contents were already
in evidence, and it was, therefore, cumulative.

The court ruled

that the video tape was probative and admissible (R.2526-2531).
Also during this in camera hearing the prosecution
objected to defense counsel's attempt to elicit testimony from
the psychiatrists and psychologists regarding the defendant's
state of mind on July 24, 1984.

The prosecution argued that,

because the defendant was not a, willing patient, the affirmative
11

defense of insanity at the time of the crime had been waived.
(R.2531-2535).

The court ruled in the prosecution's favor.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the video
tape of the crime scene was shown to the jury, and Dr. Groesbeck,
Dr. Howell, and Dr. Heinbecker all testified regerding their
observations of the defendant during his residency at the Utah
State Eospital.

Dr. Thorne, who had. never personally interviewed

or observed the defendant, lei>iifiec regarding the mental state
of the defendant and regarding the reports on the defendant's
competency to stand trial submitted by the other doctors
(R.2796-2845).
During the in camera discussion of the jury
instructions, defense counsel proffered testimony fron WilliCP
Euish, the Fourt Judicial District Court Clerk, regarding the
life sentence received by Dan Lafferty, as evidence of a
r.iit icating factor in the defendant's favor.

The court denied the

introduction into evidence of Mr. Kuisl's testimony
(R.2869-2877).
On May 27, 1985 the jury returned from its
deliberations and sentenced the defendant, Ronald Watson
Lafferty, to die (R.2938-2942).

12

SUMMARY OF APGUttENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding
defendant competent to stand trial.

The court's findings and

determination of the defendant's ability to understand the nature
of the proceedings and the penalty to be imposed and to
rationally assist counsel in his defense were* not supported by
the evidence.
The ecu it further erred prejudicially when, after the
trial court appointed counsel, the court allowed defendant to act
as his own counsel in certain respects and when it allowed
defendant to withdraw the insanity and/or diminished capacity
defense.

This cction of the court was an abuse of discretion

where the court had received evidence of the mental illness
of the defendant and then allowed the mentally ill defendant
to waive substantial defenses against the advice of counsel.
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. 5 77-i£-*(?) c^
c^plied in this instance are unconstitutional.

This statute

precludes defendants who refuse to cooperate with examiners
from presenting the defense of insanity even though, as in the
present case, the nature of the mental illness would prevent
defendant from cooperating.
The court committed prejudicial error in failing to
allow defendant to represent himself after having found him
competent to stand trial.

The court allowed defendant to waive

substantial rights against the advice of counsel.

If the court

was convinced that the defendant was capable of understanding
13

the nature of the case sufficient to waive defenses, the cent
should have allowed him to represent himself in compliance witt
the Sixtl Amendment guarantees.
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to
grant a change of venue.

In view of the unusually concentrated

and regionally publicized nature of this case and esj.eejelly in
view of the fact that defendant's brother had been tried and
convicted in Utah County, the court should have granted the
change of venue.

This fct'jire resulted in a panel of jurors who

were mere than casually informed of the case.
The couit committed prejudicial error whe-r it excluded
jurors who expressed a reluctence to inpese the death penalty or
it failed to exclude those who expressed an eye for an eye, toctlfor a tooth attitude concerning imposition of the death penalty,
thus violating defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendr ent n'cjlts.
The action of the court precluded persons who expressed some
concern, not amounting to a refusal to apply the death penalty,
from sitting, thereby weighing the panel with those who favored
the death penalty.
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it
allowed persons \vho indicated they had previously formed an
opinion that the defendant was guilty to remain as prospective
jurors, thus requiring defendant to use peremptory challenges to
exclude those who should have been excused for cause.

There was

not a single prospective juror who had not heard of the case.
A substantial number had gone so far as to form an opinion as to
14

the guilt of the defendant.

The court did not sufficently

determine that those individual! had the ability to set a£-ide
their previously fornied opinions.

Defendant's right to a fair

and impartial jury was violated.
The couit committed prejudicial error by not giving
requested voir dire questions concerning knowledge of Dan
Lafferty's trial and conviction a few months before the defendant
went to trial/ his brother had been tried and convicted in a
highly publicized trial.

The court asked some of the prospective

jurors concerning their knowledge of the previous trial and
conviction, but not all; failure to do so was prejudicial to
defendants.
The court committed prejudicial error by deathqualifying the jury by impanelling a jury that was predisposed to
conviction.

Those who are inclined to impose the death penalty

are also more inclined to convict.

The jury was not a cioss

section of individuals, but a group weighted toward conviction.
The court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based
upon the prosecutor's improper comments during his rer«arks to the
jury.

The comments of the prosecutor involved statements of

evidence which was never produced, inflammatory remarks designed
to arouse the passions of the jury and statements of personal
belief, all of which exceeded the bounds of fair comment and
resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
The trial court committed error in allowing admission
of photographs of the victims which were unduly prejudicial,
15

inf]armatoiy ar d net probative of essential facts.

The il.fnce

that the jury would base their decision out of passion was
enhanced by such evidence.

The photos were not necessary to

establish any facts and were cumlative of the other competent
evidence introduced.
The court connitted prejudicial error in admitting a
color video recording of the honicide scene (including the bodies
of the victims) which was unduly prejudicial, cur'ulatjve arc
calculated to inflane the passions of the jtry.

The court, 'n

adnittinc the color video after already having received £ 1 _' Z Z
pl-ctcs of the same subject matter , amoved the £tc^< <c ccccrplish
the announced intention of the prosecutor to "bring the sreJ] of
death into the courtroom."

Said evidence created an atmosplere

in which the consideration of the jury as to the appropriateness
of the death penalty was likely based upon passior and prejudice.
Utah's statutory scheme, in vhich the statutory
aggravating factors, also eier-ents of tie capital crime, ere
also the aggravating factors considered by the jury in
determining whether to impose the death penalty, violates due
process.

The jurors who have convicted the defendant have

already found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors
during the guilt phase.

They are then instructed that they must

find aggravating factors in the penalty phase and apply the same
reasonable doubt standard.

The jurors are already predisposed

toward death because finding that the mitigating factors
outweigh the aggravating beyond a reasonable doubt requires scne
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mental g^nnastics that are extrenely difficult if not Jia>oh«- *\ "J 6
for a lay person to do.
The t.jfO ccurt connitted prejudicial error in
excluding evidence profferred by defense counsel designed to
establish mitigating factors.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-2C7C2)

allows any factors in mitigation to be admitted.

The court

should have allowed evidence as to the sentence of Dan

Ldrfijji\<

Tie trial court committed prejudicial error by admittjrg
evidence regarding aggravating factors cutsice those wticl tire court
had indicated end instructed would be considered.

The court

allowed additional evidence of aggravation other than two statutory
factors whicl the court had indicated the State vcild be limited
to introduce.

The additional evidence did not go to either of

the statutory factors, and defendant was not aware the cot it
would allow anything other than tie two factors the court had
set forth.
Feasonable minds could not have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors
completely outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the imposition of the death penalty was ]ustified
and appropriate under the circumstances.

There was substantial

evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other
than the actual commission of the crime.
The trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing
the admission of evidence during the penalty hearing, which was
hearsay and hearsay upon hearsay.

The court allowed hearsay evidence

to be presented by the State which denied the defendant the
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opportunity to confront the declarant and which violated his di e
procedural rights to a fair hearing.

The court also allowed the

introduction of hearsay upon hearsay evidence which even further
prejudiced the jury.
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any
evidence which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the
trial in considering the penalty to be imposed.

Such procedure

is rot susceptible to meaningful review/ in that the reviewing
court cannot determine the validity of the factors which were
considered by the jury in arriving at their determination to
impose the death sentence.

It is, therefore, constitutionali\

infirm in that the death penalty may be imposed in an cibitiery
and discriminatory irannei.

Sicl" procedure is further prejudicial

in that there may be evidence introduced during the guilt phase
which is competent for a limited purpose, but which is net
competent evidence should it be offered in the penalty phase.
The court committed prejudicial error in dentine,
defendant's motion to arrest judgnent.

The court had found, and

the weight of all of the experts was, that the defendant was
mentally ill.

The court had, in fact, committed him to the Utah

State Hospital, but there had never been any finding or
determination by the court that the defendant was net mentally
ill.

Under the statutes of this state, judgment should have been

arrested.
The court erred in allowing conviction of the defendant
on the principal charge of capital homicide and the inchoate
18

offense of conspiracy to commit capital honicide.

Und^i the laws

of this state, the defendant cannot be convicted cf the piincipal
crime and the inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit the same.
APGUFFKT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I^ FINDING DEFENDANT
COMPETENT TO SI AND TRIAL.
Utah Codf- An:>„f- G " ~ r f - ] , <s trended,
provides/ "No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried
or punished for a public offense."

Section 77-15-2 defines

incompetency as follows:
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering fron a
mental disease
or defect resulting either:
(1) In his inability to comprehend the nature of the
proceedings against him or the punishment
specified for the offense charged; or
(2) In his inability to assist counsel in his
defense.
This statutory definition must be read in light of the
decision of the Un i 1 ed States Supreme Cou'i ir risky v. Urited
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

Although the Dusky opinion is a

very brief per curiam decision, it has been cited in numerous
subsequent decisions on the point of competency to stand trial.
The standard set forth in Dusky is as follows:
We also agree with the suggestion cf the
Solicitor Genera] that it js not enough for the
District Judge to find that "the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events," but that the "test must
be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding — and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."

19

The Utah standard appears to be compatible with the Dusky
standard by use of the term "comprehend."

Rationality would seem

to require comprehension/ as would comprehension encompass
rational understanding.
Applying the Dusky and Utah statutory standards to the
evidence of record in the present case, it is apparent the trial
court erred in finding the defendant "not incompetent" to proceed.
The initial evaluation of the defendant by Dr.
Washburn and Dr. Groesbeck had previously indicated a mental
disease as set forth in their respective reports to the court
in October/ 1984.

At that time, both court-appointed alienists

found the defendant to have a significant mental illness which
had been present for a number of years.

They also found that

as a result of the mental illnessf the defendant was also unable
to assist counsel in his defense or to defend himself. (See
Addendum/ Exhibit 4.)
Notwithstanding this clear and unequivocable findings
of the court-appointed alienists/ the trial court found that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
was incompetent to stand trial (R.145).

The court made the

foregoing decision on October 24f 1984.
On October 25f 1984/ the defendant's behavior at the
Utah County Jail became so irrational that the Utah County Deputy
Sheriff felt it necessary to file a second petition requesting a
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determination of the competency of the defendant (R.168-169)
alleging the defendant to "appear to become irrational" and that
he "was physically out of control and did not appear to be
mentally in control of his faculties."
On November 30, 1984, the court held a hearing wherein
the defendant was allowed to waive his right to a competency
hearing.

Consequently no hearing was held.

(Reports of the

alienists indicated the defendant was, in their opinion,
competent.)

(See Addendum, Exhibit 8.)

On December 29, 1984, the defendant attempted to hang
himself in the Utah County Jail, resulting in the third Petition
to Determine Competency being filed by the State, this time Mr.
Watson again as the affiant. (See Addendum, Exhibit 9.)

The

same alienists who had previously evaluated the defendant in
November were involved in the third evaluation.
On January 28, 1985, the court held a competency
hearing following which the court found the defendant to be
incompetent to stand trial.
During the hearing, the defendant was examined and
exhibited difficulty in remembering conversations with counsel
and facts about the case. (R.880-882,889).

The examiners

unaminously concluded that the defendant was suffering from
a mental disease or defect which prevented him from comprehending
the nature of the charges against him and the punishment
specified for the offenses charged, and that he lacked the ability
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to meaningfully assist counsel in his defense or to realistically
conduct his own defense.

(See Addendum, Exhibit 5,)

The court found that he was incompetent and ordered
defendant to be treated at the Utah State Hospital.

The court

also, sua sponte, set a rehearing on April 4, 1985.

(R.429)

On April 2, 1985 (the court changed the date of hearing
from April 4 to April 2 ) , the court held the third hearing to
determine the competency of the defendant.

At that hearing, the

reports of the alienists appointed by the court were received.
The court-appointed alienists all concurred in the opinion that
the defendant's competency had not improved, but had deteriorated
in that the defendant had developed a form of mental illness
described as paranoia and amnestic syndrome.

Their reports

further indicated the shared opinion that he could not rationally
comprehend the nature of the charges against him or the
punishment specified.

The examiners also stated the defendant

could not assist counsel as a result of the mental illness.

(See

Addendum, Exhibits 6.)
Dr. Robert J. Howell, Dr. Van 0. Austin, and Dr. C.
Jess Groesbeck testified as witnesses.

Dr. Howell testified that

in his opinion the defendant could not rationally understand the
trial proceedings (R.803), that he had suffered memory loss which
impaired his ability to assist counsel (R.795), that he suffered
from two mental illnesses which substantially impaired his
functioning (R.800), and that, if there was "any faking going on,"
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in his opinion it would be the defendant faking normality rather
than abnormality. (R.815)
Dr. Van 0. Austin testified that the loss of memory was
such a substantial impairment that the defendant's attorney would
have trouble reconstructing the facts from the defendant's
memory.

Also, the defendant's memory was so impaired that he

did not remember things he had recently been told. (R.820)

Dr.

Austin further testified that, although the defendant physically
knew where he was# he did not have a rational understanding of
the significance of that. (R.824)

He testified concerning the

significance of an I.Q. drop of 22 points, the amnesia, and
paranoid delusional systems as being a combination of factors
which resulted in the defendant's incompetence. (R.824-825)
Dr. Austin also stated that the paranoid delusional system would
interfer with the defendant's ability to meaningfully function
either independently in a courtroom or with the aid of counsel.
(R.826)
Dr. Jess Groesbeck testified that the defendant
suffered from mental illness specifically, organic amnestic
syndrome and atypical paranoid reaction, (R.839) that the
defendant did not have a rational understanding of the
proceedings, and that the paranoid delusional system of the
defendant would have to be eliminated before the defendant
would be able to cooperate with counsel or rationally
understand the proceedings. (R.841)
The only additional testimony at the hearing was that
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of a psychologist hired by the State, Dr. Eugene Thorne.

Dr.

Thorne testified that he had been contacted on March 29, 1985,
four days prior to the hearing (R.845), that he had spent a total
of four hours reviewing hospital reports (R.853) that he had never
interviewed the defendant (R.851), and that he would like to know
more about the facts upon which the other experts based their
opinion (R.857-858).

In Dr. Thome's opinion, a defendant who

viewed the trial and offenses in a totally unrealistic sense would
have an insanity defense, but would still be competent. (R.865)
Faced with the foregoing evidence, only a portion of
which has been recited herein, the court found the defendant not
to be incompetent after taking the matter under advisement
(R.472).

The court further allowed the defendant to waive his

right to the defense of insanity. (R.898-903)
During the course of the trial, defense counsel was
compelled to make a record concerning the lack of cooperation on
the defendant's part, for example, the defendant's unwillingness
to make a decision, after which he would object to the direction
counsel pursued.

(R.2057-2067)

After defense counsel called a witness to provide
evidence upon which the jury could find a lesser charge of
manslaughter, the defendant objected and forbade his attorney to
pursue the manslaughter defense, which had been suggested by the
attorney.

The defendant understood the strategy to be plea

bargaining (R.2459) and an admission of guilt.

Defendant elected

to go against advice of counsel, interrupted defense counsel in
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the middle of his summation to the jury, and told him to wind up
his argument, (R.2520-2521)
In light of the great weight of the evidence from
those who had an opportunity to observe and evaluate the
defendant for several months, and who possessed the expertise
to, the trial court erred in finding the defendant "not
incompetent."

He did not cooperate with counsel.

In fact,

he demonstrated the result of his paranoia by accusing counsel
of trying to plea bargain, ordering counsel to cease calling
witnesses and to cease summation.

He waived the sanity defense

against advice of counsel and simply did not cooperate with
counselfs efforts to defend him.

Applying the Utah standard and

the Dusky standard of competence to the facts of this case, the
defendant was simply not competent to stand trial in a case where
the information charged two capital crimes, in addition to several
first degree felonies.
POINT II
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL, IT ERRED
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO ACT AS HIS OWN COUNSEL
IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AND PARTICULARLY IN ALLOWING
DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW THE INSANITY AND/OR DIMINISHED
CAPACITY DEFENSES.
Since the trial court appointed counsel to represent the
defendant, it was improper for the court to allow the defendant
control over the substantive aspects of the proceedings.
It is clear that it appeared to the jury that counsel
was conducting the trial on behalf of the defendant. Therefore,
it was improper for the court to allow the defendant to interfere
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with the proceedings and the trial*
According to 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 71 (1981),
"lilt has been held that where defense counsel offers to prove the
defendant was insane at the time of the act and was insane at the
time of the trial, such evidence must be received even against
the defendant's will."

See also People v. Merkouris, 297 P.2d

999 (Cal. 1956) where the appellate court found the trial
court's use of discretion abusive where it permitted the
defendant/ over the objection of counsel, to withdraw the
insanity plea*
Also according to 21A Am. Jur* 2d Criminal Law §767
(1981):
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is not
entitled as a matter of right to be heard by
himself and also by counsel and an application or
request by an accused to act as co-counsel may be
denied in the discretion of the trial court, at
least in the absence of showing or indication of
special need therefore. Nor is an accused
entitled to have the services of an attorney for
purely advisory purposes.
Under the general rule a defendant who is
represented by counsel has no constitutional
right to act as co-counsel and make his own
summation.
And according to 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 996:
The defendant in criminal proceedings is not
entitled as a matter of right to be heard by
himself and also by counsel, in what amounts
to a form of hybrid representation, or have the
services of an attorney for purely advisory
purposes. And the right of the accused to have
the assistance of counsel is not infringed by
requiring him to elect between taking charge of
his own defense and having it conducted by
counsel.
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, even in
the absence of an objection and where it is clear that the
interests of justice so require, the court should instruct on
appropriate defenses notwithstanding the lack of a requested jury
instruction or an objection to the introduction of evidence.
State v. Close, Utah, 499 P.2d 287 (1972); State v. Cobo 60 P.2d
952 (1936); State v. Poe, Utah/ 441 P.2d 512 (1968).
At the very least, since the court had previously found
the defendant to be mentally ill, the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the insanity defense and the diminished
capacity defense.

After the jury found the defendant guilty, the

court should have also found that, as a matter of law, the
defendant was quilty and mentally ill, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§ 77-35-21.5, as amended.
Since the defendant had previously made himself
available for evaluations on numerous occasions, and since
numerous evaluations of the defendant were made by the court
appointed doctors, Utah Code Ann., § 77-14-4, as amended, was
substantially complied with, and the court committed reversible
error in not allowing counsel to present evidence on the defenses
of diminished capacity, insanity, and mental illness.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN., § 77-14-4(2), AS AMENDED, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In light of the nature of the defendant's wellestablished mental illness (R.479), a strict interpretation of
§ 77-14-4(2) would allow a mentally ill (and statutorily insane)
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defendant to discard the defense of not guilty by reason of
insanity or diminished capacity.

Such an interpretation of this

section denies the defendant due process of law in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Further^ this section violates the defendant's constitutional
privilege of equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution.
It appears that a strict reading of this statute allows
a trial court to find a mentally ill defendant guilty of a crime,
simply because the defendant suffers from paranoia and refuses to
cooperate with the alienists who have been appointed to examine
him, all the while claiming that he is sane.

By reading this

statute so strictly, the trial court abused its discretion
and failed to protect the rights of the defendant.
It is clear that the only possible situation in which
this statute would be constitutionally valid is a situation
where the defendant refuses to cooperate with courtappointed examiners, but, wishes to have his own independent
examiners testify at trial.
675 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1982).
the present defendant.

See United States v. Campbell,
However, such is not the case with

The defendant, through counsel, did not

seek to have independent examiners testify, while excluding the
testimony of court-appointed doctors.

In fact, the reverse

appears to be true; that is, the prosecution called a doctor who
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had not examined the defendant*
By denying the defendant the same due process of law
and equal protection that a more cooperative mentally ill
defendant would have received, the trial court in the instant
case refused the defendant his best defense and thereby committed
reversible error.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF.
The right sought to be exercised by the defendant/
to-wit:

the right to represent himself, is set forth in the

Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; Article
12, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah; and the
Utah State Code Ann., §77-32-2.

Each of these provisions have

been interpreted by the various courts which have considered the
question to recognize the right of the defendant in a criminal
case to represent himself and his ability to reject counsel and
to not have counsel forced upon him.
The defendant who is indigent is not in the position as
result of his indigency, where he must accept appointed counsel
any more that the court could force a defendant who is not
indigent to employ counsel.

The defendant has a right to

proceed to trial in a criminal case without counsel to assist him
or to represent him and has a right not to have the counsel
forced upon him.

The provision of Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-2

provides two situations in which a court may appoint counsel:
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First, where the defendant requests it; and second, "the court on
its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant does not
affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be
represented."

(Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, the

defendant did not request the court appoint counsel but
specifically, on the record, waived his right to counsel and
rejected the opportunity to be represented and did so at every
stage of the proceedings at which he was questioned concerning
his intentions and wishes regarding counsel.

At every stage

of the proceedings, Defendant had been thoroughly and
competently advised of his right to counsel and the willingness
of the court to appoint counsel, at the request of the defendant,
should Defendant change his mind at any point and desire to be
represented by counsel.

He had, moreover, been urged by each of

the respective judges, who had so advised him, that, in the
opinion of the court, he should accept counsel and proceed with
counsel, rather than proceeding as his own counsel.

Again, after

receipt of such advice, the defendant recognized the concern of
the court, indicated to the court that he had considered his
decision to act as his own counsel, and made knowing and
intelligent waiver as to counsel either orally upon the record,
or through written motions, based upon an understanding of the
consequences which could occur as a result of his selfrepresentation.

It is apparent from the record that the trial

court had no more authority under Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-2, to
appoint counsel in this case than the court would have had to
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force someone who is not indigent to hire counsel rather than
defend himself.
The Utah Supreme Court has considered a situation
somewhat similar to the present case in the matter of gtate v.
Penderville, Utah, 272 P.2d 195 (1954).

In Penderville

the defendant was charged with second-degree homicide.

The

defendant in Penderville originally had counsel which he had
employed and then later attempted to discharge.

The day before

trial the defendant appeared before the court and requested a
continuance in order to procure new counsel to represent
him at trial.

The court declined to allow a continuance to the

defendant for the purpose of obtaining additional counsel, whereupon the defendant elected to defend in person rather than proceed
with counsel he had discharged or was about to discharge.

The

defendant apparently made this choice notwithstanding a warning
from the court that his defense should probably be made by
counsel.

The court, notwithstanding such election by the

defendant to represent himself, appointed the same attorney who
had been discharged or was about to be discharged to conduct
defendant's defense at the trial.

The question of whether or not

the court committed error in refusing to permit defendant to
conduct his own defense was considered by the appellate court.
At 272 P.2d 199 the court stated:
This question cannot be answered by reaching a
conclusion that the appellant was better defended
by counsel than he would have been without the
aid of counsel. The Constitution of this State
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused
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shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel." Const. Art. I, § 12.
Courts of last resort in several states have
similar constitutional provisions in their
application to facts quite similar to those in the
present case. 17 A.L.R. 266 and cases there cited.
It is generallyr if not universally held that the
accused in a criminal proceeding who is sui juris
and not mentally incompetent has the right to
conduct his own defense without the aid of
counsel.
On that same page the court further stated:
Can it be said that the appellant lost his right
to defend in person by his unsuccessful effort to
have his trial postponed to get other counsel?
We think not. The right to defend in person
certainly should not be denied an accused in a
situation where he must either choose to use
it or proceed with counsel in whom he has lost
confidence. We hold that the court erred in
denying the appellant the right to try his case
without the aid of counsel and that because of this
error he is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court reversed the judgment of conviction and
defendant was granted a new trial.

The principle enunciated by

the Utah State Supreme Court in interpreting Article I Section 12
was that the Constitution of the State of Utah recognized the
right of the defendant upon his election to proceed without
counsel/ and that counsel cannot be forced upon him as long as he
is competent to stand trial and represent his interests.

In the

instant casef the trial court held a competency proceeding in
which the court found the defendant/ Ron Laffertyf competent to
understand the nature of the proceedings against himr to
understand the possible punishment against him, and to assist
counsel in his defense.

The defendant, under the Penderville

case, should have been allowed to proceed without counsel.
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The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States has also been interpreted as providing the criminal
defendant with the right to represent himself in a criminal
proceeding.

In Faretta vs. California/ 422 U. S. 806

(1975) the defendant was charged with grand theft in an
information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles Countyf
California.

At the arraignment stage the judge assigned to

preside at the trial appointed the public defender to represent
Faretta.

Well before the date of trial/ however/ Faretta

requested that he be premitted to represent himself.

Questions

by the judge revealed that Faretta had once represented himself
in a criminal prosecution/ that he had a high school education/
and that he did not want to be represented by the public defender
because he believed that the office was very loaded down with a
heavy case load.

The judge responded that he believed Faretta

was making a mistake and emphasized in further proceedings that
Faretta would receive no special favors.

Nevertheless, after

establishing that Faretta wanted to represent himself and did not
want a lawyer/ the judge in a preliminary ruling accepted
Faretta1s waiver of the acceptance of counsel but indicated/
however/ that he might reverse this ruling if Faretta was unable
to adequately represent himself.

Some time later, the judge/ on

his own motion/ held a hearing to inquire into Faretta1s ability
to conduct his own defense and questioned him specifically about
the hearsay rule and state law governing challenge to potential
jurors.

The judge, upon receiving the answers from Faretta,
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reversed his earlier ruling permitting self-representation and
appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's
subsequent request for leave to act as co-counsel was rejected/
as were his efforts to make motions on his own behalf.

The United

States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the
context of the Faretta facts at 422 U. S. 819-20 stated:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that
a defense shall be made for the accused; it
grants to the accused personally the right to
make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel,
who must be "informed of the nature and cause
of accusation," who must be "confronted with the
witnesses against him," and who must be accorded
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor." Although not stated in the Amendment
in so many words, the right to selfrepresentation — to make one's own defense
personally — is thus necessarily implied by the
structure of the Amendment. The right to defend
is given directly to the accused; for it is he
who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails.
Further, the court stated at 422 U. S. 833-34:
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant,
rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of
counsel, and quite another to say that a State
may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does
not want. The value of state-appointed counsel
was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the
notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to
them. And whatever else may be said of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no
doubt that they understood the inestimable worth
of free choice.
In the present case, as has been previously stated, the
defendant had been advised regarding his right to appointed
counsel at several stages of the proceedings and had elected to
proceed without counsel.

He had been advised that, in the court's
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opinion it would be more advantageous to his defense to present
his case through the use of competent counsel.

Nonetheless, after

being fully advised of the possible peril and dangers of representing himself, the defendant still elected to proceed as his own
counsel; However, the trial court refused to
opportunity.

afford

him that

The court ultimately held that "tiln forcing Faretta,

under these circumstances, to accept against his will a stateappointed public defender, the California courts deprived him
of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense."

Id. at

836.
As is held in Faretta, and the other cases on this
point, the defendant need not demonstrate to the court any
particular degree of legal skill or sophistication, other than a
basic understanding of the right to counsel, a willingness to
voluntarily waive that right and the advantages of counsel, and
to, therefore, reject counsel.

There is no requirement that the

defendant understand the Pules of Evidence, the Rules of Civil
Procedure, or be familiar with the other procedures involved in
a court trial.

The record must simply show that "he knows what

he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open."

Id. at

835, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. at
279.
The record is clear in the instant case that the trial
court had adequately and frequently advised the defendant that
the defendant would probably be better off presenting his case
through the use of counsel.

However, the defendant continued to
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assert his right of self-representation, and the judge did
appoint counsel against the defendant's clearly expressed wishes.
The Court in Faretta hypothesized one final reason for allowing a
defendant the right of self-representation, "Moreover, it is not
inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in
fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own
defense.11

422 U.S. at 834.

Perhaps, the defendant in the

instant case, might have done better for himself than his
appointed counsel did.
Even had the defendant's right to self-representation
been preserved through the appointment of standby counsel, his
counsel acted far beyond the limits of Faretta.

In McKaskle v.

Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984), the trial court allowed
the defendant to act as his own counsel with the assistance of
standby counsel.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant's

right to representation of his own case was not violated by the
use of standby counsel, even in the situation where standby
counsel took an active part in some phases of the trial proceedings phases of the trial proceedings.

The Court held that the

defendant's right to defend himself had not been violated by the
participation of standby counsel, where the participation was
either outside the presence of the jury or, when in the presence
of the jury, was at the request of the defendant.

However, while

arriving at that holding, the court did state as a general rule
at 104 S.Ct. 946 the following:
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It is when standby counsel participate in the
jury's presence that a defendant may legitimately
claim that excessive involvement by counsel will
destroy the appearance that the defendant is
acting pro se.
The court at page 949 concluded that:
The pro se defendant must be allowed to control
the organization and content of his own defense/
to make motions/ to argue points of law/ to
participate voir diref to question witnesses/
and to address the court and jury at appropriate
points in the trial.
Further the court at page 950 stated:
We recognize/ nonetheless/ that the right to
speak for oneself entails more than the
opportunity to add onefs voice to the cacophony
of others* As Wiggins contends/ the objectives
underlying the right to proceed pro se may be
undermined by unsolicited and excessively
intrusive participation by standby counsel. In
proceedings before a jury the defendant may
legitimately be concerned that multiple voices
"for the defense" will confuse the message the
defendant wishes to convey/ thus defeating
Faretta's objectives. Accordingly/ the Faretta
right must impose some limits on the extent of
standby counsel's unsolicited participation.
First/ the pro se defendant is entitled to
preserve actual control over the case he chooses
to present to the jury. This is the core of the
Faretta right. If standby counsel's
participation over the defendant's objection
effectively allows counsel to make or
substantially interfere with any significant
tactical decisions/ or to control the questioning
of witnesses/ or to speak instead of the
defendant on any matter of importance/ the
Faretta right is eroded.
Second/ participation by standby counsel without
the defendant's consent should not be allowed to
destroy the jury's perception that the defendant
is representing himself.
Wiggins recognizes the right of the court to
appoint standby counsel/ even over the defendant's objection/ to
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relieve the court of the need to explain and enforce the basic
rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in
overcoming routine obstacles standing in the way of the
defendant's acheivement of his own clearly indicated goals.
The position of counsel in Wiggins is substantially
different than was position of appointed counsel in the present
case.

In view of the trial court's rulings as to the compentency

of the defendant/ and especially in light of the obvious
disagreements between defense counsel and the defendant as
to how the representation should have proceeded/ the court
erred in not allowing the defendant to represent himself/ a right
recognized by this Court in the Penderville case, supra as well
as in subsequent cases.
564 P.2d 768 (1977).

See State v. Domingues/

Utah/

As set forth in Faretta and Penderville/

supra/ denial of this substantial right requires reversal.
POINT V
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The Utah Constitution provides that in criminal
prosecutions/ the accused shall have the right to a trial "by an
impartial jury ..." Constitution of Utah/ Article If Section 12.
Utah Code Ann./ § 77-35-29(e) (1980 as amended) deals
with the bases that may be employed by a defendant to request the
court for a change of venue.

That subsection, also known as Rule

29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows:
If the prosecution or a defendant in a
criminal action believes that a fair and
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impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either
may, by motion, supported by an affidavit
setting forth facts, ask to have the trial
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
If the court is satisfied that the
representations made in the affidavit are true
and justify transfer of the case, the court
shall enter an order for the removal of the
case to the court of another jurisdiction
free from such objection and all records
pertaining to the case shall be transferred
forthwith in such another county.
In addressing the issue of pretrial publicity, the Court
in

State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71, 88 (1982), established that the

defendant has the burden of proving that a "fair and impartial
trial cannot be held in the county where the action is pending*"
It is generally accepted that the defendant must show a
reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of relief such as a
change of venue, a fair trial cannot be had.

It is also

generally understood that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice does
not mean that prejudice must be more probable than not.

Fraizer

y. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486
P.2d 694 (1971); People v. Welch, 104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d
225 (1972); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Ak. 1979).
The most recent Utah case addressing the pretrial
publicity issue is Codjanna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101 (1983).
In Codianna the Court recognized that:
An accused can be denied a fair trial where
the process of news gathering has allowed such
a free reign that it intrudes into every aspect
of a trial and creates a "carnival atmosphere"
and where the publicity is so weighted against
39

the defendant and so extreme in its impact that
members of the jury are encouraged to form strong
preconceived views of his guilt. Id. at 1111;
Shepherd v. Maxwell/ 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. C.
1507, 1519% 16 L.Ed 2d 600 (1966).
Mo case in recent Utah history has received as much
publicity as the instant case.

The nature of the alleged crime

has been detailed explicitly in numerous accounts, as well as the
Lafferty connection to the alleged crime.
Lafferty, the defendant's brother,

The trial of Dan

was reported in daily

accounts on television and in the media.

The testimony of

specific witnesses was recounted in those articles.

The fact

that Dan Lafferty was convicted was widely broadcast in all of
the media available to the major population in Utah County.
There had been articles in the newspaper quoting jurors, who sat
in the Dan Lafferty case, as to their view of the evidence and
the fact that they would have given the death penalty except for
some "strange" views of two jurors.

No articles discussed any

other suspects, the fact that Dan Laffertyfs conviction was
against the weight of the evidence, or stating any other facts as
to doubts of the two brother's guilt.
During the voir dire process, all eighty-seven of the
prospective jurors indicated that they had knowledge of the
events of July 24, 1984 and of the ongoing proceedings against
Ron and Dan Lafferty.

Indeed, the publicity was so weighted

against the defendant, that sixty percent of the prospective
jurors indicated during individual voir dire that they believed
Ronald Lafferty was guilty of tfre murders of Brenda and Erica
Lafferty.
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In determining whether a massive, pervasive and
prejudicial pretrial publicity can so bias a community as to
require change of venue, the trial court should consider:
The inflammatory nature of the publicity;
the degree to which the publicity was circulated
throughout the community; the length of time
elapsed from the dissemination of the publicity
to the date of trial; care exercised and the
difficulty encountered in the selection of a
jury; familiarity of prospective trial jurors
with publicity and the result and effect upon
them; the challenges exercised by the defendant
in selecting the jury, preemptory challenges/
and for cause; the connection of government
officials with the release of publicity; the
severity of the charge; and the size and type
of area from which the venire is drawn.
State v. Crudup/ 11 Wash. App. 583/ (1974); People v. M c C r a n ,
549 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1976).
All of the above factors/ taken together and applied to
the instant case/ clearly establish a situation in which the trial
court should have granted a change of venue to a county in which
the pretrial publicity was less concentrated.

While none of the

prospective jurors indicated they were unaware of the casef more
importantly/ sixty percent indicated that they had not only heard
or read about the case, but that their knowledge, attained
through media or word of mouth/ had brought them to the point of
forming an opinion of the guilt of the defendant.

With only

twelve peremptory challenges/ the defendant was not in a position
to remove all of those individuals who had indicated a prior
opinion of the guilt of the defendant.

In fact/ five persons who

were ultimately selected as jurors as well as both alternate
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jurors had formed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant.
(Susan G. Heath R.1225-1226; Heidi Nielson Strong R.1378; Ila C.
Lundberg R.1417-1424; Richard Roy Eubank R.1340-1342; Richard
Barry Westwood R.1576-1576; Arietta G. Wilkey R.1612-1615; Patrick
W. Shumway R.1631-1634.)
It is difficult to conceive a situation where a change
of venue would be more appropriate than in the present case.
Defendant respectfully submits the trial court erred in refusing
to grant Defendants motion to change the venue.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING JURORS WHO
EXPRESSED A RELUCTANCE TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
OR BY FAILING TO EXCLUDE THOSE WHO EXPRESSED AN
EYE FOR AN EYE, TOOTH FOR A TOOTH ATTITUDE
CONCERNING IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, THUS
VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right
to a jury trial while the Fourteenth Amendment's rights of due
process guarantee the right to a fair and impartial jury.
Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1985).
In Witherspoon v. Illinois/ 391 U.S. 510, (1968) the
court outlined the standards which must be applied in determining
whether a jury is properly impanelled with regard to the
possibility of the imposition of a sentence of death.

The

Witherspoon case held "that a sentence of death cannot be
carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was
chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they
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voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.
No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the hands
of a tribunal so selected."

Id. at 521-23.

In the Illinois trial, it appeared to the court
that the prosecution had eliminated almost half of the potential
jurors by challenging them under an Illinois statute allowing for
challenge if potential jurors expressed any qualms about imposing
the death penalty.

The court held that such exclusion of persons

expressing conscientious objections allowed for a jury that was
uncommonly willing to condemn a man to death.
The Witherspoon court also established the standards to
follow in choosing which persons could be excluded for cause:

a

juror must indicate in unambigious and unmistakable language that
he would automatically vote against the imposition of the death
sentence in any circumstance without regard to the facts presented.
Also, such a juror

must state that his beliefs regarding the death

penalty would prevent him from reaching an impartial decision
regarding the defendant's guilt because of his awareness that a
defendant found guilty might receive a death sentence.

Therefore,

according to Witherspoon/ a mere belief in the invalidity of
capital punishment or feelings against capital punishment are not
adequate to exclude a juror for cause, but such belief or feelings
must rise to the level of an incapacity to impose the death penalty
under any circumstances.

Mr. Justice Stewart stated:

"The most

that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be
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willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and
that he not be irrevocablly committed before the trial has begun to
vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and
circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings."
Id. at 521-22, n.21.
Since the Witherspoon case the Supreme Court, as well as
the state courts, has

attempted to conform the procedure for the

selection of juries to the Witherspoon standard.

One of the more

recent cases decided by the Supreme Court is the case of Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).

The Adams case stated with regard to

a Texas statute:
As employed here, the touchstone of the inquiry
under Section 12.31(b) was not whether putative
jurors could and would follow their instructions
and answer the posited questions in the affirmative if they honestly believed the evidence warranted
it beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the touchstone
was whether the fact that the imposition of the death
penalty would follow automatically from affirmative
answers to the questions would have any effect at all
on the jurors1 performance of their duties. Such a
test could, and did, exclude jurors that stated that
they would be affected by the possibility of the
death penalty, but who apparently meant only that
the potentially lethal consequences of their decisions
would invest their deliberations with greater
seriousness and gravity and would involve them
emotionally. Others were excluded only because they
were unable to positively state whether or not their
deliberations would in any way be affected. But
neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor
inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever
is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability
on the part of the jurors to follow the courtfs
instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of
their feelings of the death penalty. The grounds
for excluding these jurors were consequently
insufficient under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor in our view would the Constitution
permit the exclusion tof a juror from the penalty
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phase of a Texas murder trial if they aver that
they will honestly find the facts and answer the
questions in the affirmative if they are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, but not otherwise/ yet
who frankly concede that the prospects of the death
penalty may effect what their honest judgment of the
facts will be or what may deem to be a reasonable
doubt, Id. at 49. (Emphasis added.)
The Oklahoma case of Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686,
(Okla. Crim. Ct. 1982) stated that a sentence of death can not be
carried out if the jury which recommends it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction.
Another case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court is
the case of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). In the
Lockett case, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated
murder and sentenced to death.

On appeal the defendant

contended that four prospective jurors had been excluded in
violation of her Sixth and Fourteeth Amendment rights under
Witherspoon*

The Supreme Court rejected that argument because

each of the four jurors was questioned regarding the death
penalty and unequivocably stated that he or she would not take
an oath "to try this case and follow the law."

The jurors had

been asked if they were so opposed to the idea of capital
punishment that they would not be able to sit and listen to the
evidence and the law and then determine, based on the evidence
and the law, that capital punishment should be imposed.
The court held that exclusion for cause was proper because the
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four jurors had each said he would not take an oath*

See also

Maxwell v. Bishop/ 398 U.S. 262/ (1970); Woodards v. Maxwell/
303 F. Supp. 690 (D. Ohio 1969);

Woodards v. Cardwell/ 430 F.2d

978/ (6th Cir.); People v, Goodrich/ 70 Cal. 2d 824/ 452 P.2d
637/ 76 Cal. P.ptr. 421 (1969); People v. Washington/ 71 Cal. 2d
1061/ 458 P.2d 479/ 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969); People v, Vauqhny
71 Cal. 2d 406/ 455 P.2d. 122, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1969);
People v. Chacon/ 69 Cal. 2d 765f 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. P.ptr. 10/
34 ALR 3d. 454 (1968); State v. Watson/ 20 Ohio App. 2d 3 if»r 252
N.E. 2d 305 (1969).
One of the most recent Utah cases regarding this issue
is the case of State v. Norton/ Utah/ 675 P.2d 577 (1983).
The Norton case stated the general principal to be followed in
voir dire in a capital punishment case:

"On the issue of capital

punishment, the object of voir dire is to obtain a jury that can
hear the evidence and apply the law without legal partiality for
or against capital punishment.

Approval of or opposition to

capital punishment in general is not legal partiality for this
purpose." JId. at 589.

In Morton the court vacated the death

sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

This

was because of the court's failure to comply with defendant's
request that potential jurors be asked "Is there any member of
the panel who feels that/ if an individual is convicted of first
degree murder/ then the penalty must be death?"

The Norton court

held that the refusal of the court to ask the question was errorf
even though the court had asked.the jurors questions regarding
their willingness to follow the instructions of the court and
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even though the court appeared to feel satisfied that the jurors
would follow the instructions.
The Norton case also dealt with the issue of
exclusion of a juror who "indicated that she could not vote
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances."
588.

Id._ at

The Court held that that exclusion was proper.
The trial of Ron Lafferty received a great deal of

publicity because of the nature of the crime and also because
this defendant had to be tried following the trial of his brother
Dan Lafferty.

As a resultf during the questioning may of the

jurors were familiar with the case. Many jurors were also
familiar with the fact that Dan Lafferty had received a life
sentence.

During the two-and-one-half day jury qualification

session/ the defendant objected and moved to have dismissed for
cause several jurors who exhibited the attitude of "an eye for an
eye, tooth for a tooth," or a belief that they felt it necessary
to impose the death penalty where a death had occurred.

Ha

Lundberg (eventually chosen as a juror) stated that she would
probably not impose the death penalty if the mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factors. (See R.192-194, 1423; Judith Ann
Johnson, R.1523-1524; and Patrick Shumway, R.1633-1634.)
Some jurors were not given an adequate explanation of
the standard to be applied in the penalty phase.

(See Judith Ann

Johnson, R.1423-1424; Richard Barry Westwood (eventually chosen
as a juror), R.1580-1581; Vivian Best, R.1607-1610; Terry
Melendez, R.1123-1124.)
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Two jurors were excluded for having expressed some
concern over the imposition of the death penalty,
Paulitz, R.1148-1150.)

(See Jean E.

Ms. Paulitz, when asked if she would

follow the law as it related to the death penalty being imposed,
said that she was not sure about that.

The Court did not

question her further regarding this issue.

The court did not ask

her if she would take the oath and endeavor to follow the law.
Also expressing some concerns over the death penalty
was Max Baldwin (R.1560-1567).

Mr. Baldwin expressed the belief

that he had formed no opinion and that he felt he would be an openminded juror.

And when asked if there was any reason that he could

not sit as a juror and render a fair and impartial verdict he
responded, "No" (R.1565).

When asked about the imposition of

the death penalty, Mr. Baldwin responded "It's a hard question to
answer.

I would have to say that right now I don't know whether

I can or not." (R.1566)

The court then questioned Mr. Baldwin as

to his feelings about what he would do but failed to ask
him whether he would impose the death penalty if he was
instructed that that was the law and that the mitigating
circumstances were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances so
that the death penalty was proper.

The court did not ask Mr.

Baldwin if he would follow the law and take the oath.
The court failed in questioning jurors clearly and
explaining

clearly the standards to be imposed in determining

the issue of the death penalty.

Further the court allowed the

exclusion of two jurors who did not respond unequivocably that
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they would not impose the death penalty if the law dictated it
should be imposed.

The court also refused to excuse for cause

those jurors who exhibited an "eye for an eye, tooth for a
tooth" attitude regarding the death penalty.

Such error on

the part of the court requires that the matter be set for
retrial consistent with Pitts v. Sockhart, 753 F.2d 689 (8th
Cir. 1985) or at the least remanded for resentencing.

This is

consistent with the most recent Supreme Court cases and also the
Utah cases cited, State v. Norton, Utah, 675 P.2d 577 (1983).
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING INDIVIDUALS
WHO INDICATED THAT THEY HAD FORMED AN OPINION
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY TO REMAIN AS
PROSPECTIVE JURORS THUS REQUIRING DEFENDANT USE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE THOSE WHO SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCUSED FOR CAUSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e) (13) requires that jurors
be excused for cause
"[if they have] formed or expressed an unqualified
opinion or belief as to whether the defendant was
guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
"the state of mind exists on the part of the juror
with reference to the cause, or to either party,
which will prevent him from acting impartially
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason as having formed or
expressed an opinion upon a matter and caused to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor,
statements in public journals or common notarity,
if it satisfactorly appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion,
act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him."
The case of People v. Moorer, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 913, (NY
App. Div. 1980) well states the general principle of law that
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should be applied in a case of this nature.

The trial court

in that case held that anyone who expressed questionable
impartiality in the interest of fairness should be disqualified.
Further the case of People v. Gurule, 628 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1981)
held that it was error not to excuse someone with a set opinion
and an unwillingness to set aside that opinion.

Defendant in the

present case was required to use all of his peremptory challenges
in excluding members of the jury, several of whom he had moved to
excuse for cause.

The trial court, however, denied his motions

for removal for cause and thus required that the defendant
exercise his peremptory challenges for those persons.

Although

many persons were aware of the proceedings and almost all jurors
questioned had heard something about the case, there were several
who said they hadn't formed an opinion.

The court erred in

failing to exclude those persons who stated that they had formed
an opinion as to the defendant's guilt and/or they were aware of
and knew of Dan Lafferty's trial.

There were sufficient persons

who could have been found, who, although they had heard the
publicity of the trial, said they had formed no opinion, or that,
if they had formed an opinion, it wasn't that the defendant was
necessarily guilty.
Defendant moved to exclude the fourteen jurors for
cause because they stated that they had formed an opinion and/or
that they had formed an opinion and were aware of the proceedings
in the Dan Lafferty trial.

Richard Barry Westwood (R.1575-1581)

eventually served on the jury.

Anetta G. Wilkie (R.1610-1618)
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eventually served on the jury, but expressed throughout her
questioning by the court that, although she felt she had not
formed an opinion/ she wondered whether she could provide the
defendant with the presumption of innocence, or whether she
thought she would like a juror of her own frame of mind to judge
her.

She expressed considerable doubt concerning her ability to

set aside her opinion of the defendants guilt, because of the
trial of Dan Lafferty.

Defendants motion to excuse for cause

was denied*
Patrick Shumway, who eventually served as a juror
(R.1629-1634), said that it was a hard question for him to answer
as to whether he had an expressed opinion.

Cecile Gallertine

said that she had formed an opinion and had followed the
trial of Dan Lafferty.

She said that the opinion she had formed

was that the defendant was guilty and that she had talked about
it with people from work. (R.1110-1117)

Bernadine Marie Packer

(R.1067-1076) said that her husband had formed an opinion that
the defendant was guilty, and that she had watched television
newscasts and felt that her opinion would be a concern to her if
she were the defendant*

She stated that, if she were the

defendant, she would prefer someone who had not heard what she
had and that her opinion regarding his guilt was a strong
opinion.

Defendants motion to strike for cause was denied.

Defendant then used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse
this juror.
Brian C. Groo (R.1266-1278) said that he had heard
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about the trial through the television and newspaper/ had
discussed it with people and had an opinion that the defendant
was involved.

He stated that it was a hard question for him to

determine whether he would be comfortable having a person with
his frame of mind on the jury.

He stated that he had the opinion

that the defendant was guiltyf and that he was confident of his
opinion.

Defendant's motion to dismiss for cause was denied.

Defendant then used a peremptory challenge to excuse this juror.
Also expressing similar opinions were Bruce Tuckett/ R.1325;
Susan Heath, who was selected as a juror/ R.1225-1232; Jack
Donaldson/ R.1172-1173; Richard Roy Eubcrk, vho was eventually
chosen as a juror, R.1340-1342; Heidi Nelson Strong/ R.1378; Janet
Taylor/ R.1396-1400; Ila C. Lundberg/ who was eventually chosen as
a juror, R.1417-1424; and Craig Ray Watkinsf R.1493-1494.
POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED VOIR
DIRE QUESTIONS CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF DAN LAFFERTY'S
CONVICTION AND ITS EFFECT ON PROSPECTIVE JURORS.
In the Utah case of State v. Norton/ Utah/ 675 P.2d
577 (1983) the Court reversed the sentence of death based on the
trial court1s failure to ask the requested question/ "Is there any
member of the panel who feels that if an individual is convicted
of first degree murder/ then the penalty must be death?"

The

defendant in Norton argued that he was denied the right to an
impartial jury (Id, at 589). The court reasoned that/ not only
should questions be asked to determine whether a juror should be
excused for cause/ but also to allow the defendant
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n

an

intelligent exercise of a peremptory challenge,"

Id. at 589.

This same principle applies in the Ron Lafferty case in that the
defendant is allowed to ask those questions which would either
have a bearing on whether a juror should be excused for cause or
would lead to information that would allow them to intelligently
use the peremptory challenge.

The court erred in not allowing

the defendant in the instant case to exercise his rights by
asking the requested questions concerning Dan Laffertyfs
convictions.

Id. at 587.

See also State v. Taylor,

594 P.2d 211 (Kan. 1979).
POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED BY FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE OF DEATH
QUALIFYING AND THUS ALLOWING A JURY TO BE IMPANELED
WHICH IS PREDISPOSED TO CONVICTION.
This question was addressed most recently in the case
of State v. Moore, Utah,697 P.2d 233 (1985) and is one that
continues to be a concern. There are currently cases pending
before the United States Supreme Court regarding this question.
Numerous articles and cases have mentioned the issue.

In

addition to the discussion in the Moore case, in the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, Judge J. Scott Daniels
ruled in the Francis Mitchell trial that it is not a violation of
a defendants Sixth Amendment rights to have one jury for the
the guilt-innocence phase and a different jury for the
penalty phase of the trial.

This procedure is being followed

elsewhere and most notably in Arkansas.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Grigsby v.
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Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) currently is pending before
the United States Supreme Court (cert, granted 10-7-85).

This is

a case which Utah, as well as many other states, has joined in
because of the importance of the issue to be decided.

Grigsby.

involves a capital case out of Arkansas in which the state
prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus.

The Federal District

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ruled that defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated by the Arkansas court
who excluded jurors who stated that they would, under no circumstances, vote for the death penalty.

The Court of Appeals affirmed

the lower court's decision and held:
We find substantial evidentiary support for the
district court's findings. We find that substantial
evidence supports the court's finding that a capital
jury, with WE's [Witherspoon Excludables] stricken
for cause, is in fact conviction prone and, therefore,
does not constitute a cross-sectional representation
in a given community. In view of our finding on the
Sixth Amendment violation, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue whether the jury in petitioners'
cases was in fact a biased jury. We affirm, with
modification, the judgment of the district court. We
vacate that portion of the district court's judgment
which requires the state to utilize two separate
juries; one to determine guilt-innocence and another
for the penalty phase of the trial. We leave the
actual procedural remedy to the discretion of the
state. Id. at 229.
The Eighth Circuit noted in its reasoning that the
Witherspoon case stood for the principle of the necessity of an
impartial jury as provided under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

The Witherspoon case expressly left open the issue

of whether a death-qualified jury is conviction prone because no
data was available at the time to support the finding.
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The court

indicated a willingness to rule on the issue upon the necessary
data.

Witherspoon at 520 n.18.

Since the Witherspoon decision,

numerous studies have been done which firmly establish that a
death-qualified jury is more likely to convict than a jury which
has not been death qualified. Grigsby at 232-236.

The studies

indicate that in death-qualifying a jury, a systematic exclusion
of a "distinctive" group occurs in violation of the rule
established in Durren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,364 (1979) and
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 538 (1975).
This reasoning, which led the Eighth Circuit to set
aside the conviction of the defendant, applies equally in the
State of Utah.

In the instant case two jurors were excluded

by the court for cause because they expressed concern over their
ability to vote for capital punishment.

The jurors who remained

to be chosen included only those who had not been systematically
excluded and were, thus, conviction prone as the studies
indicate.

This process clearly violated the defendant's rights

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Since the violations involved included Constitutional
guarantees, any decision which may be following from the United
States Supreme Court would necessarily be retroactive.

Ruiz v.

Lockhart, 754 F. 2d 254 (8th Cir. 1985).
POINT X
THE PROSECUTION1S ARGUMENTS BOTH IN THE TRIAL AND IN
THE PENALTY PHASE CONTAINED STATEMENTS THAT CALLED
ATTENTION TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING AND WERE UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in their
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arguments to the jury, including the right to discuss the evidence
from their own standpoint, inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. See State y. Valdez, Utah, 513 P.2d 422 (1973);
State v, Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975).

However, this broad

latitude for arguments made to the jury is more limited in
capital cases "because of the acknowledged uniqueness of the
death penalty."

State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 271 (1980).

In the instant case the prosecution's opening statement and
closing argument contained prejudicial facts that were never
presented or received into evidence and could have had no
effect other than to prejudice the jury.
This court has established that the standard for
reviewing the comments of counsel is n(l) the remarks called to
the jurors1 attention matters which they would not be justified
in considering in reaching a verdict, and (2) unc'er the
circumstances, the jurors were probably influenced by the
remarks."

State v. Johnson, Utah, 663 P.2d 48,51 (1983) (citing

State v. Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (1982).
In the prosecutor's closing argument, he mentioned the
existence of a "hit-list." (R.2481).

Although no evidence to that

effect had ever been introduced, he attempted to convince the
jurors that there was indeed,

a "hit-list":

he, therefore,

far exceeded his duty to use "scrupulous care" as required
by Brown, 607 P.2d at 271.

The prosecutor also, in effect,

testified that the defendant "stood over her and he grabbed
her hair, and he pulled her head back so that the blood from
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her heart would pump freely to the kitchen floor." (R.1672).
Such a bold assertion of fact should have been established
through actual evidence/ yet the horrible picture he painted on
the minds of the jurors was never substantiated.

Indeed these

were substantial matters that the jury would not be justified in
considering.
It is important to recognize that the prosecutor had
painted a graphic description of what supposedly took place and
that the defendant was compared to a mobster with a hit-list.
This, coupled with a higher standard of care required in a
capital case, is sufficient to establish that the jury could have
been influenced by the remarks and have made a less than rational
decision.
The prosecutor also committed error in his closing
statement during the penalty phase, which included unfair
references to his own belief of essential issues and extremely
prejudicial statements of his knowledge, amounting to a
prejudicial influence over the jury.
It is essential to reemphasize the scrupulous care
required of the prosecution in capital cases such as this one.
It is in the penalty phase that the jury must choose between the
two most serious penalties that the law can impose.

It is not a

clear-cut determination that might be found in the
guilt-innocence phase, but a delicate balancing at only the
essential facts, a balance in which the smallest error may
incorrectly tip the sensitive scales.
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It is because of the

extreme importance of a correct decision that error in the
penalty phase should not be overlooked on the chance that it may
not have been unduly prejudicial. State v. Poe, Utah, 441 P.2d 512
(1968); Brown, supra.
In the prosecution1s final statement to the jury, the
prosecutor again referred to the [defendant's! hit-list."
(R.1869)

Later, he repeatedly and unfairly commented on his own

belief and hypothesis of the defendant's state of mind.
(R.1876-82).

It has generally been held that it is error for the

prosecutor to inject his personal opinion into his jury argument.
State v. Williams, 621 P.2d 423 (Kan. 1980); State v. Sr.oot, 590
P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1978); People v. Bickley, 372 P.2d 100 (Cal.
1962).

But perhaps the most critical error of all was when, at

the close of the prosecutor's entire argument, he stated:
He will kill again. He will murder. He will take
another human life. The only thing, Ladies and
Gentlemen, and believe me, I know exactly what i"m
saying to you,...the only thing between you and the
only thing between him and his next victim is you.
The only thing that's going to save the life of the
next victim of his is you. (R.1889)
This statement was far beyond the boundaries of mere
opinion; it was a statement of the prosecutor's own knowledge,
knowledge that was nowhere evident in the record nor even
admissible.

In effect the prosecutor was testifying as though he

had a higher knowledge.

He effectively stated that he personally

knew that the defendant would kill again unless the jury returned
with the death penalty.
This declaration was not only completely improper and
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based on mere speculation/ but it was used solely for the purpose
of inciting the jurors1 passions and tears.

In doing so, the

prosecutor committed grievous prosecutorial misconduct, unduly
prejudiced the jury and violated the command of the United States
Supreme Court when it declared, "tilt is of vital importance to
the defendant and the community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion.11

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 349, 358

(1976).
POINT XI
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HOMICIDE VICTIMS WHICH WERE UNDULY
PREJUDICIAL AND NOT PROBATIVE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows for the
exclusion of relevant evidence when "the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or other problems."
The Utah Supreme Coi rt has stated, in relation to a challenge
that photographs of the victim were unduly prejudicial,
"photographs that are gruesome are not inadmissible if they are
probative of essential facts, even though they may be cumulative
of other evidence."

State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60,63 (1983).

The "key consideration in the application of this rule," the
Court held, was "the relevence of the photographs." Id.

The

court has held that slides of a victim's body have "no probative
value" when "[a]11 the material facts which could conceivably
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have been adduced from viewing of the slides had been established
by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony."
441 P.2d 512, 515 (1968).

State v. Poe, Utah,

In the instant case, as in the goe

case, the record clearly establishes that any material fact which
the photographs might have established had already been
established by uncontradicted testimony; therefore, the
photographs should not have been admitted.
The trial court determined that the photographs were
not cumulative and admitted the photographs of the victims for
the reasons stated by the prosecution and because "they may have
some bearing upon the degree of the crime." (P.1931,32)

However,

as the defense pointed out, this information was to be or had
already been established and was uncontradicted. (P.1935-38)
Therefore the photographs were merely repetitious of evidence
already before the jury.
Exhibit #20, a photograph of the slain child, was
offered, according to the prosecution, to show the length of the
wound, that it was inflicted without a "sawing action" (R.1934),
and that the wound was consistent with a particular knife. Id,
However, all of this evidence was sufficiently established by the
medical examiner's testimony and report. (R.1970-93)

It is

highly unlikely that the purpose stated by the prosecution would
actually be served.

The gruesomeness of the photograph with the

child's throat gaping open is undeniable, so much so that it is
extremely unlikely that the jury could focus on the extent of the
"sawing action."

The prosecution could have better funfilled
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its stated purpose by the medical examiner's own testimony and
demonstration.

Therefore, the only purpose the photographs

served was to incite the jurors to passion, prejudice, or hatred.
While the Court in fiarcia determined that photographs
may be admissible even though they are cumulative of other
evidence, the cumulative effect of gruesome photographs is an
essential element in determining whether the probative value is
minimized and outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

The Garcia

court determined that in Eoe, "[slince the only material facts
that could conceivably be adduced from viewing these gruesome
photographs were otherwise well established and uncontradicted .
. . the only purpose they served 'was to inflame and arouse the
jury.1" 663 P.2d at 63 (citing Poe, 441 P.2d at 515).

Similarly

in State v. Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979), the Court held
that "because the defendant did not dispute [the] shooting...,
and because the medical examiner testified that the victim died
as a result of the gunshot, the admission of the photographs was
superfluous."

Because the photographs were merely repetitious,

the Court determined that there was "no evidentiary value" for
the photographs and they were wrongly admitted (although the
court goes on to determine that it was not prejudicial error).
Id.

In State v. Allies, 606 P.2d 1043, 1054 (Mont. 1980), the

Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court committed
reversible error by admitting pictures that were "extremely
gruesome and quite capable of inflaming the minds of the jury."
As a basis for this determination the Allies court held that the
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photograph1s demonstiative purpose (including position of the
bodies at the scene) "could have been and was established [by the
medical examiner] without the use of the photographs."
There is no doubt that the photographs of the victims
are extremely gruesome and prejudicial, when compared to the
pictures described in Poe.

Due to the fact that any purpose they

might have served was sufficiently established and
uncontradicted, their actual purpose was only to incite the
jurors1 passions, disgust and vengeance.
The trial court also admitted into evidence a
picture of the victims in a family photo (Exhibit #34). There is
nothing in the record to demonstrate the relevancy of this
photograph to the prosecution's case.

In People v. Ramos, 639

P.2d 908 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court held that the
trial court erred in admitting photograph of victim while she was
still alive.

Similarly, in Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244

(Okla. Crim. App. 1981), the court held that reversible error had
occured when a photograph of the victim was displayed for the
jury.

The court stated that "the jury should not have been

concerned with what the [victim] looked like prior to the offense
committed." Id. at 1246.

The court determined that "liln a close

case, on appeal, such a photograph may well tip the scales in
appellant1s favor."

Id.

This Court has stated that, in distinguishing between
harmless and reversible error, the court will look to determine
whether there is a "reasonable probability or likelihood the
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result would have been more favorable to the defendant,"

Wells,

603 P.2d at 813, see also State v. Fisher, Utah, 680 P.2d 35
(1984).

In determining this probability it must be remembered

that "Is]crupulous care must be exercised by the State in capital
cases in both the guilt-determining and penalty phases in
presentation of evidence and argument because of the acknowledged
uniqueness of the dealth penalty."

State v« Brown, Utah, 607

P.2d 261, 271 (1980).
It is especially probable that the above photographs
"could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the death
penalty" and "with the defendant's life at stake, this court
should not hazard a guess."

Poe, 441 P.2d at 515.
POINT XII

THE DISTRICT
RECORDING OF
PREJUDICIAL,
THE PASSIONS

COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED A COLOR VIDEO
THE HOMICIDE SCENE WHICH WAS UNDULY
CUMULATIVE AND CALCULATED TO INFLAME
OF THE JURORS.

During the crucial and vital penalty phase where
scrupulous care is to be taken, the trial court allowed the jury
to view a color video of the crime scene.

The massive amounts of

blood made the video unquestionably prejudicial and, in effect,
even more dramatic than had the prosecution introduced hundreds of
photographs.

The obvious prejudicial and cumulative effect could

only be justified if the video had a substantial probative value.
The purpose of the video was dramatically etched into the juror's
minds by the prosecution's closing argument in which he stated,
"We saw red blood, fresh blood, and the smell of death.

And

that's why, quite frankly, I tried to show that video tape; so
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that you could get a feeling of what the smell of death is
actually like."

(R.2885)

With that on their minds the jury

retired to deliberate on the life or death of the defendant, a
vital and delicate decision which the United States Supreme Court
has determined should "be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion."

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S.

349, 358 (1976).
The purpose of the video was obvious from the
prosecution1s own declaration and worked to incite the passions
and vengeance of the jurors.

For this reason the court should

set aside the defendant's sentence of death.
POINT XIII
UTAH'S SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS STATUTE FOR CAPITAL
FELONY CASES VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS, WHICH ARE NECESSARY
ELEMENTS OF THE CAPITAL CRIME, ARE ALSO THE
AGGRAVATING FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE JURY IN
DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCE.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972) the Supreme
Court reversed the death sentence imposed upon the defendant and
held that the death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that the penalty would
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

The effect

of that holding was to deem unconstitutional many of the capital
punishment statutes throughout the United States.

As a result, a

majority of the states, including Utah, modified or rewrote their
capital punishment statutes in order to comply with the
constitutional standards required under gurman.

One of the

developments adopted by several states, including Utah, is a
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bifurcation of the trial into an initial guilt-innocence phase
and a subsequent the penalty phase.

Drafters of the Model Penal

Code, as quoted in Sregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976),
concluded:
[If a unitary proceeding is used] the determination of
the punishment must be based on less than all the
evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such, for
example/ as a previous criminal record of the accused,
or evidence must be admitted on the ground that it is
relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or
innocence alone. Trial lawyers understandably have
little confidence in a solution that admits evidence
and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should
be considered only in determining the penalty and
disregarded in assessing guilt.
The obvious solution ... is to bifurcate the
proceeding, abiding strictly by the Rules of Evidence
until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt
has been determined opening the record to further
information that is relevant to sentence. This is the
analog of the procedure in the ordinary case when
capital punishment is not an issue; the court conducts
a separate inquiry before imposing sentence.
ALI Model Penal Code, Section 201,6, Comment 5, pages
74-75, (Tent. Draft #9, 1959).
The purpose, then, of the bifurcated trial is to permit
a limitation on the evidence admitted to avoid unfair prejudice
to the defendant during the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence.

After the determination of guilt, the penalty phase

of the trial begins.

In that phase,

[elvidence may be presented as to any matter the court
deems relevent to sentence, including but not limited
to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the
defendant's character, background, history, mental
and physical condition, and any other facts in
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any
evidence the court deems to have probative force may
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be received regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence. Utah Code Ann.,
§ 76-3-207(2).
The purpose of broadening the scope of evidence to be
considered by the jury is to permit the defendant to present
evidence of factors which mitigate against imposition of the
death penalty.

Often this evidence would be inadmissible in the

guilt-innocence phase of the trial because of its irrelevance in
determining guilt.
Another reason for bifurcation of the trial as
indicated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code quoted above is
that the jury often cannot distinguish between evidence which
should be considered only in determining the penalty and
disregard it in assessing guilt.

The Supreme Court has

recognized that there are limitations on a jury's ability to
disregard incriminating evidence against a defendant despite
limiting instructions from the court. In Eruton v. United Statesf
391 U.S. 123 (1967), evidence of a
implicating his co-defendant was

confession by the defendant
admitted.

The defendant

invoked his right not to testify and, therefore, the co-defendant
could not cross-examine the defendant. The trial court instructed
the jury, an impossible task —

to consider the evidence only

in determining the guilt of the defendant but not the codefendant.

The Supreme Court said "We hold that, because of the

substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the
contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in
determining [co-defendant1si guilt, admission of [defendant's]
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confession in this joint trial violated co-defendant's right of
cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment."
Similarly, in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1963),
the New York practice has been to submit the issue of
voluntariness of a confession to the jury along with the
determination of guilt or innocence.

The jury was told that, if

it found the confession involuntary, it was to disregard it
entirely, and determine guilt or innocence solely from the other
evidence in the case; alternatively, if it found the confession
voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and
afford it weight accordingly.

The Supreme Court said that "the

New York procedure poses substantial threats to a defendant's
constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely
disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably
determined.

These hazards we cannot ignore."

Id. at 389.

The

Supreme Court held that the New York procedure was a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
the determination of voluntariness of confession must be determined
in an independent hearing to avoid unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
Under Utah law, the defendant in the instant case was
charged with first-degree murder.

During the trial phase the

jury was required to determine two issues:

First, whether

criminal homicide had been committed in connection with one
aggravating factor, thereby enhancing the crime to first-degree
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murder; and second, whether the defendant was guilty of committing
the act of first-degree murder.

The Utah Code Ann. §7i5-5-202

states:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another under any of the following circumstances. •.
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during
which two or more persons are killed...
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved
manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physicial
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily
injury to the victim before death.
(2)

Murder in the first degree is a capital offense.

In the instance case, the defendant was found guilty
in a jury trial of first-degree murder because of the presence
of the two enhancing or aggravating factors listed in (b) and (g)
of the statute.
Dpon conviction of a capital felony § 76-3-2G6
and § 76-3-2C7 control the penalty phase of the bifurcated
trial.
it —

During the penalty phase, the jury has one issue before

whether the defendant is sufficently culpable for his act

warranting imposition of the death sentence.

During the penalty

phase the jury must consider the aggravating factors as compared
to the total mitigating factors.

The jury must be persuaded

beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravating factors outweigh
total mitigating factors and they must be further persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death
penalty is justified and appropriate under the circumstances.
State V. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981).
Section 76-3-2C7 lists seven statutory mitigating
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factors which may be considered and refers to § 76-5-202 for the
list of statutory aggravating factors.

These statutory aggravat-

ing factors are the same factors which the jury has already
considered in finding the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.

However,

the purpose of the penalty phase in not to determine guilt,
but rather culpablility and sentence.

Because the only statutory

aggravating factors to be considered during the penalty phase are
those for which the defendant has already been found guilty, the
jury is prejudiced against the defendant regarding those factors.
The distinction that the jury must make between the
purpose of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and the penalty
phase is too obscure and approaches the same degree of mental
gymnastics as was required by the trial courts in J_ackson v.
Denno, gupr_a and Bruton v. United States, supra.

The jury enters

the penalty phase of the trial believing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating factors are present.

This statutory

scheme shifts the burden of proof from the state to the
defendant.

The defendant must now prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the total mitigating factors outweigh total aggravating
factors and therefore the death penalty is inappropriate in his case.
The capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Florida,
which were deemed constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, supra

and

Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) do not list the elements
of the capital crime as aggravating factors.

In contrast, the

Utah statute, § 16-3-2C7, incorporates by reference § 76-5-202 as
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the only statutory aggravating factors.

This significant

difference in the Utah statute shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant, is highly prejudicial and violates due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The scope of review established for reviewing alleged
error in the penalty phase of a capital case was stated in State
V. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981).

The Court said that "in the

penalty phase it is our duty to determine whether the sentence of
death resulted from error, prejudice, or aibitrariness, or was
disproportionate."

The shifting of the burden of proof caused by

the mental gymnastics required of jurors by this statute causes
great prejudice to the defendants in capital cases and produces
arbitrary and disproportionate results in the sentencing in
capital cases.

This error is so prejudicial that it violates the

defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore the death sentence as determined by the jury should be
reversed in the instant case.
POINT XIV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE PROFFERRED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH MITIGATING FACTORS.
As discussed in the previous section the evidenciary
standards for admission of evidence of the penalty phase of the
trial are greatly reduced, thereby permitting introduction of
evidence which would not otherwise be admissible at trial.
Section 76-3-207(2) states:

"In these sentencing proceedings,

evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems
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relevant to sentence/ including but not limited to the nature
and circumstances of the crime/ the defendant's character,
background/ history/ mental and physical condition/ and any other
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.

Any evidence

the court deems to have probative force may be received
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence." (Emphasis added.)
In the penalty phase of the instant case, the only
aggravating factors relied on by the state were those statutory
aggravating factors found in § 76-5-2C2 (1)(b) and (q)
(multiple deaths and heinous nature of murder).

Section 76-3-2C7

(2) outlines the possible mitigating circumstances:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

(e)
(f)
(g)

The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activities;
The murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;
The defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person;
At the time of the murder/ the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirement of law was substantially
impaired as a result of mental disease, intoxication/ or influence of drugs;
The use of the defendant at the time of the crime;
The defendant was an accomplice in the murder
committed by another person and his participation
was relatively mild;
And any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.

The trial court committed prejudical error and abused
its discretion during the penalty phase when it denied admission
into evidence testimony by the district court clerk regarding the
two life sentences received by Dan Lafferty.
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On the morning of

the last day of trial, in the judge's chambers prior to calling
the final witness, defense counsel proferred testimony by
William Huish, the district court clerk.

Defense counsel said,

"I would think that to allow the jury to gauge the relative
contributions of the defendant, make some evaluation as to
control and dominion and yet not have the ultimate fact, that is,
how the other co-defendants were disposed of in the fact, is
ridiculous.
stop."

I just think that you just go halfway and just

(R.2874-20)
The court denied the proffer and stated, "I don't think

it has any bearing at that stage, because I think what happened
to other defendants similarly situated, including the co-defendants,
is probably a matter to be taken into consideration on an appeal to
the Supreme Court or some other place."

(P.2875)

Although the Arizona Supreme Court found that there is
no requirement that the court impose identical sentences upon two
co-defendants, State v. Schlarp, 541 P.2d 411, (Ariz. 1975), the
Idaho Supreme Court later found that it was not error that a
trial court compared a defendant with his co-defendant, nor that
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a greater
sentence upon the leader of the two.

State v, Eovcutt, 620

P.2d 795 (Idaho 1980).
In the penalty phase of a defendant's trial, § 76-3207(2) permits a broad range of evidence which is admissable
to establish mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered
by the jury.

Also in that section, one of the statutory
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mitigating factors is "(g) And any other fact in mitigation of
the penalty."

As the testimony of Dr. Groesbeck, Dr. Howell, and

Dr. Eeinbecker indicated the defendant suffered a shared
paranoia with Dan Lafferty Dr. Groesbeck and Dr. Powell testified
that Dan Lafferty was the dominant person in the shared paranoia.
(R. 2645-2653, R. 2729-2738, R.2781)

The juryfs consideration of

Dan Laffertyfs sentence as a mitigating factor would have been
relevant to its decision regarding imposition of the death
penalty on the defendant.

The trial courtfs refusal to admit

such testimony by Mr. Huish was an abuse of discretion which was
prejudicial to the defendant.

Therefore, the defendant's death

sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment.
POINT XV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION IN ADDITION TO
THE STATUTORY FACTORS SET FORTH IN THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS.
Instruction Number 3 (See Addendum, Exhibit 10)
instructed the jury as to the factors the jury could consider in
aggravation or mitigation of the death penalty.

Only two

aggravating factors were set forth for the jury to consider:
1.

The homicide was committed incident to one act,

scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two
or more persons were killed.
2.

The homicide was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any
of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious
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physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before
death.
In addition to giving the foregoing instruction, the
court also orally advised the jury, prior to the commencement of
the penalty phase, that there would only be two factors to be
considered in aggravation, those set forth above. (P.2538)
Further, the court had previously informed counsel that the only
aggravating circumstances would be the two set forth above.
(R.2529)
The prosecutor was allowed, over objection, to cell Lt.
Jerry Scott of the Utah County £herifffs Department to testify as
to alleged assault the defendant had committed while incarcerated
in the Utah County Jail.

There were four such incidents related,

none of which had any connection or relationship to either of the
aggravating factors which the court had stated would be
allowed.

The defendant had not been convicted, nor was he even

charged with any criminal act in regard to any of the four
incidents.
The Washington Supreme Court considered a similar
situation in which the prosecution introduced evidence during the
penalty phase of crimes alleged to have been committed by the
defendant but of which he had not been convicted.

In State v.

Bartholomew, 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982) the court stated:
To allow the jury which has convicted defendant of
aggravated first-degree murder to consider evidence
of other crimes of which the defendant has not been
convicted is, in our opinion, unreasonably prejudicial
to defendant. A jury which has convicted defendant of
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a capital crime is unlikely to fairly and impartially
weigh the evidence of prior alleged offenses. In
effect/ to allow such evidence is to impose upon a
defendant who stands in peril of his life the burden
of defending/ before the jury that has already convicted him/ new charges of criminal activity.
Information relating to defendant's criminal past
should therefore be limited to his record of convictions*
The admission of the testimony of Lt. Scott concerning
the alleged assualts was additionally prejudicial in that the
defendant had no prior notice that such evidence would be
introduced and/ therefore/ no opportunity to rebutt the
allegations.

As was stated in Bartholomew/ the effect upon the

jury of such evidence places upon the defendant an unreasonable
burden.
POINT XVI
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE PENALTY
HEARING/ REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT FIND BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE TOTALITY OP THE
AGGRAVATING FACTORS TOTALLY OUTWEIGHED THE
MITIGATING FACTORS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND
THAT THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IS
JUSTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
This Court in State v» Wood/ Utah/ 638 P.2d 71 (1981)/
established the standard of proof in capital penalty proceedings
to be that: "falfter considering the totality of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances/ you must be persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total
mitigation/ and you must further be persuaded/ beyond a
reasonable doubt/ that the imposition of the death penalty is
justified and appropriate in the circumstances.11

648 P.2d 83.

Defendant produced evidence of many factors in
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mitigation, including, but not limited to, the following:
1.

The defendant had no prior criminal record.

(R.2849-2850)
2.

The homicides were committed while defendant was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
(R.2644, 2779, 2790)
3.

The defendant acted under the substantial

domination of another person,
4.

(R.2649-2653, 2730)

At the time of the homicides the capacity of the

defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirement of the law was substantially
impaired as a result of mental disease* (R. 2792)
5. The defendant was presently mentally
ill.

(R. 2629, 2714-15, 2778-79)
6.

Evidence of past community and public service,

church positions and defendant's qualities as a friend and
neighbor.

(R.2768, 2778-79, 2877-79)
It is apparent from the record that the totality of the

mitigating circumstances was sufficient to, at least, rise to the
point of establishing a reasonable doubt as to whether the death
penalty should be imposed in the present case.
POINT XVII
THE TRIAL CODRT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING HEARSAY AND HEARSAY UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE
AT THE PENALTY HEARING.
During the penalty phase, the State introduced, over
objection of defense counsel, evidence through Lt. Jerry Scott.
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Portions of Scott's testimony involved a recounting of what a
cellmate of defendant, Joel Montgomery, had related to Scott.
(R.2568)

Montgomery was not called to testify and Scott's

recounting of* Montgomery1s statements constituted hearsay.
Additionally, Lt. Scott related information told to him by
co-defendant Dan Lafferty.

This information was as follows:

". . . And then he proceeded to tell me that Ron had been trying
to grab him and would kill him if he had the opportunity to, and
he was really scared of him and he was afraid that Ron would try
to kill himself.11 (R.2570)
The foregoing hearsay statements were extremely
prejudicial to the defendant in that he had no opportunity to
confront the witnesses against him as required by Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1967).

Although the language of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(1) provides for the admission of any
probative evidence regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence, this Court has not viewed that
statute as a carte blanch authorization to allow such normally
inadmissible evidence as that described above in the penalty
hearing.
In State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 271 (1980) the
Court stated:
And that scrupulous care must particularly extend to
evidence introduced by the State in the penalty phase
when the evidence is probative but would not be
admissible under the exclusionary rules of evidence
in the guilt-determining phase. When the State offers
this type of evidence in the penalty phase, it must
be certain that it is not prejudicial to the defendant
— prejudicial, of course, in a legal sense.
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It is worth noting that the hearsay evidence introduced
as described above was not probative of either of the two
aggravating factors allowed by the court, in addition to being
legally prejudicial to the defendant.
Further, the court allowed hearsay upon hearsay when
the court allowed Scott to testify to statements of defendant
made to Montgomery, his cellmate, which were related by
Montgomery to Scott and by Scott to the jury. (P..2569)

The said

testimony was offered in an attempt to show that the defendant
had attacked Montgomery over an argument as to which television
program they should watch. (R.2543)

In Brown, supra/ the court

held the admission of hearsay upon admissible hearsay to be
prejudicial error.

The statement of defendent here introduced

was not admissible hearsay in that it was not an admission, but
rather hearsay upon inadmissible hearsay.

The court committed

error in allowing such evidence as set forth above since such
evidence was both legally prejudicial and non-probative of either
of the two aggravating factors set forth by the court.

The

nature of the error is of constitutional proportion, in that, as a
result, the defendant was denied due process of law.

See Gardner

v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1976).
POINT XVIII
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER
ANY EVIDENCE WHICH HAD BEEN ADMITTED IN THE
GUILT PORTION OF THE TRIAL IN ADDITION TO
THOSE ADMITTED IN THE PENALTY PORTION.
The trial court instructed the jury in the penalty
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phase via Instruction Mo. 3, thet the jury could consider
"•••all of the evidence which has been admitted in the case."
(See Addendum, Exhibit 10.)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)

outlines what evidence may be admitted during the penalty phase
of a capital case.

This provision does not provide that the jury

may consider evidence introduced during the guilt phase.
court advised the jurors they could consider:

The

"All evidence

which has been admitted in the case, as well as evidence which
may be introduced in this penalty phase, is available for your
consideration.

It does not have to be reintroduced again, but

may be referred to by counsel on both sides if they so desire."
(R.2541)
The prosecutor relied heavily in his closing arguments
in the penalty phase from evidence not introduced in the penalty
phase.

He referred to medical testimony describing the victims

heart pumping blood about the floor (R.2891), alleged prior
criminal activity of defendant, i.e. stealing gas, food, etc.
(none of which had been the subject of a conviction or charge
against the defendant) (R.2891), marriages of defendant (R.2902),
a hit-list (R.2903) and many other matters which were the subject
of testimony introduced at the guilt phase of the trial.
This procedure denies the defendant due process in that
the defendant does not have the opportunity to object to evidence
which may have been competent during the guilt phase, but would
be objectionable if offered during the penalty phase.

For

example, the evidence of prior criminal activity of defendant for
79

which he had not been convicted may have had some advisibility in
the guilt phase, but should have been excluded in the penalty phase*
In addition to the problem of admissibility, the more
serious due process violation is the difficulty of determining and
rationally reviewing the process and evidence upon which the jury
based its determination that the death penalty was appropriate
and that the totality of mitigating factors was outweighed by the
totality of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
The imposition of any standard of procedure or process of
determination is constitutionally flawed if there is no effective
means of review.

It is difficult to perceive how this Court can

make meaning of the evidence and factors upon which the jury
based their considerations of the death penalty issues.

The trial

court did not require the jury to make any specific findings as
to the factors or evidence they considered.

Even bad the jury's

consideration been limited to the evidence introduced at the
penalty phase, this court would have a difficult test.

However,

the overly broad invitation of the court to consider "any and
allw evidence introduced during the guilt and penalty phase
imposes an impossible test upon the appellate court.

In Gaiflner

v^ Florida, supra at 361, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Since the state must administer its capital sentencing
procedures with an even hand, it is important that the
record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the
considerations which motivated the death sentence in
every case in which it is imposed. Without full
disclosure of the basis for the death sentences, the
Florida capital sentencing procedures would be subject
to the defects which resulted in the holding of
unconstitutionality in Fucman v. Georgia.
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The trial court violated the defendants right to
procedural due process by allowing the jury to consider matters
not introduced in the penalty phase, since no meaningful review
can be had of the factors upon which the jury based their
decision to impose the death penalty.
POINT XIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-23, as amended:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence,
the court upon it own initiative may, or upon
the motion of the defendant shall, arrest
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for
the arrest of judgment.
Since the court found as a matter of law that the
defendant was mentally ill (R.471), the court erred as a matter
of law in not granting the motion to arrest judgment.
The term mental illness appears in several sections
throughout the code.
amended.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5, as

However, mental illness is only defined in Utah Code

Ann. § 64-7-28(1), as amended.
Therefore, since the court had already found as a
matter of law that the defendant was mentally ill, it erred in
denying the defendants motion to arrest judgment.
POINT XX
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTH CAPITAL
HOMICIDE AND THE INCHOATE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of capital
81

homicide, as well as two counts of conspiracy to commit capital
homicide.

Conspiracy, an inchoate offense, is defined in Utah

Code Ann. § 76-4-201 as follows:
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of
conspiracy when he, intending that conduct
constituting a crime be performed, agrees with
one or more persons to engage in or cause the
performance of such conduct and any one of them
commits an overt act in pursuance of the
conspiracy, except where the offense is a
capital offense, a felony against the person,
arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act
is not required for the commission of conspiracy.
According to the State1s theory of the case, the
defendant, with three others, planned to carry out the killing
of four individuals in rapid succession. (P.1677)

Two of these

four individuals were the victims alleged in the two counts of
criminal homicide, while the remaining two individuals, Richard
Stowe and Chloe Low, were the alleged intended victims in each of
the two conspiracy counts.

The record is devoid of any testimony

or other evidence presented supporting the existence of a
separate agreement or conspiracy to commit homicide of the two
conspiracy victims.

Although Chip Carnes testified that there

was a meeting during which the homicides were discussed (P..1282),
there was no evidence presented regarding any separate meetings
or any separate agreements to kill Low and Stowe.

The evidence

would, if at all, support only one agreement to kill four
individuals, rather than separate conspiracies to commit two
capital homicides.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-302 provides:

82

No person shall be convicted of both an inchoate
and principal offense or of both an attempt to
commit an offense and a conspiracy to commit the
same offense, (Emphasis added,)
The defendant, having been convicted of the principal
offense of capital homicide, could not have been convicted of the
inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit capital homicide with
regard to the homicide victims.

The only possible victims of a

conspiracy for which the defendant could have been convicted were
Richard Stowe and Chloe Low.

The record simply fails to provide a

basis for having convicted the defendant of two additional and
separate conspiracies.
CONCLUSION
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on all six
counts in the Information and a reversal of his sentence of
death.

In the alternative, he seeks a new trial and a reversal of

the death penalty, upon the basis that the trial of defendant in
both the guilt phase and the penalty phase did not meet
constitutionally mandated procedure, which resulted in substantial
prejudice to defendant.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1986.

MICHAEL D/~ES?LIN
Attorney for Appellant

Gary JU 7 Weight
Attorney for Appellant
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UTAH COUNTY, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

_ _ _

%%gBmxer,

SECDND AMENDED

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
RONALD WATSCN LAFFERTY, DAN
ZHARLES LAFFERTY, RICHARD M.
"RICK" KNAPP, aka RICKY MARTIN
KNAPP aqd CHARLES ALAN "CHIP"
CARNES
Defendants.

Criminal No. 84-CR-186

The undersigned
Gary C a i d v e i i
and belief that the defendant(s) committed the cnme(s) of:

t

under oath states on information

COUNT I :

CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of
76-5-202(1) (b), Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that they/ on or about July
24, 1984, in Utah County, Utah, knowingly and intentionally caused the death of
Brenda Lafferty incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode in which two or more persons were killed.
ODUNT II:
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of
76-5-202(1) (b), Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July
24, 1984, in Utah County, Utah, knowingly and intentionally caused the death of
Erica Lafferty incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode in \ghich two or more persons were killed.
COCNT III:
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-6-203, Utah
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County,
Utah, unlawfully entered the duelling of Brenda Lafferty, with the intent to corrmit
felony, and that during the oonmission thereof, the actor or another participant
in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon.
COCNT IV:
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-4-201, Utah
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County,
Utah, did agree with one or more persons to engage in conduct intending that the
criminal homicide of two or more persons, including Chloe Lew, a Capital Offense,
be ooiuidtted.

COUNT V:
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a Felcny of the First Degree, in violation of 76-6-203, Utah
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, an or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County,
Utah, unlawfully entered the duelling of Chloe Lav, with the intent to aoimit a
felcny, and that during the oonmission thereof, the actor or another participant
in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon.
COUNT VI:
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-4-201, Utah
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah Cbunty,
Utah, did agree with one or more persons to engage in conduct intending that the
criminal homicide of t**o or more persons, including Richard Stowe, a Capital Offense,
be oomnitted.

This Information is based on evidence from the following witnesses:
Gary C a l d w e l l , A . F . P . D .
Authorized for presentment and filing:
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EXHIBIT 2

C O P Y

IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 9309
vs .
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY
and DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY,
Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the aboveentitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled
court, on the 23rd and 24th days of October, 1984, at Room
310, County Building, Provo, Utah;
That there appeared as counsel representing plaintiff State of Utah, WAYNE B. VJATSON, ESQ.,
Deputy Utah County Attorney, and NOALL T. WOOTTON, ESQ.,
Utah County Attorney; and that both defendants appeared pro
se, and that court-appointed standby counsel representing the
defendants, MICHAEL D. ESPLIN, ESQ. and GARY H. WEIGHT, ESQ.J
were both in attendance.

I

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings
were had, commencing at the hour of 2:05 o'clock p.m.,

I

1

INDEX OF WITNESSES

2

PHILLIP WASHBURN:

D-52, D-60, C-67, RD

3

CRAIG L. RASVALL:

D-69.

4

BRENT H. HARRISON:

D-72.

5

(Mark Reed - not p resent, p.80)

6

NOALL WOOTTON:

D-80, D-83, RD-86.

7

TRACY STEVE VALDEZ

D-87.

8

WAYNE WATSON:

D-91, D-92.

9

JERRY SCOTT:

D-93, D-94.

10

ROBERT J. SUMSION:

D-95, D-97.

11

(Dave Olson - not present, p,97)

12

(Barry Crowther - not present, p. 97)

13

MICHAEL K, JENSEN:

D-(98)99.

14

KAY JENSEN:

D-103.

15

JOSEPH DIMICK:

D-105.

16

GEORGE E. BALLIF:

D-108.

17

CHALDUN A, BUTLER:

D-118.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

THE COURT:

As I indicated before the

2

recess:

3

36, Utah Code Annotated, to determine whether or not the

4

defendants, or either of them, are incompetent to proceed,

5

as defined in Section 77-15-2, Utah Code Annoted, 1953 as

6

Amended,

7

The issue in this case has been raised by the

8
9

This is a hearing under Section 77-15-5 and 64-7-

state, by the filing of a petition, pursuant to Section
J

10

77-15-3, alleging that both defendants are incompetent to
proceed,

11

I

12

I present; that the state is represented by Mr. Wootton, Utah

13

( County Attorney, and by Mr. Watson, Deputy Utah County

14

I Attorney.

The record will show that both the defendants are

And the record will show, further, that standby

*5 I counsel previously appointed by the Court are present.
16

The record will show also that the Court appointed

17

two alienists to examine the defendants with regard to their

18

competency to proceed under Section 77-15-5, Utah Code

19

Annotated, 1953, on October 1, 1984; and that the reports

20

of the examination

21

by the Court and are made a part of the record.

22

by the two alienists have been received

Further, that copies of the reports were furnished

23

to the defendants; and that this hearing is being held not

24

less than five nor more than 15 days after the report from

25

the alienists were received: and copies furnished to the

1

defendants,

2

The Court will further, or, the record will

3

further show that the Court has excluded from the courtroom

4

all persons not necessary to the conduct of the proceedings.

5

Now, Mr. Ron Lafferty, do you have counsel?

6

RON LAFFERTY:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes.

RON LAFFERTY:

10

THE COURT:

No, I'm certainly not.

And, Mr. Dan Lafferty, are

you represented by counsel?

12

DAN LAFFERTY:

13

THE COURT:

14

Are you represented

by counsel.

9

11

Do I have counsel?

No, I'm not.

Do either or you, or both

of you, want counsel to represent you in this proceeding?

15

RON LAFFERTY:

I don't.

16

DAN LAFFERTY:

No.

17

THE COURT:

18

this proceeding, counsel

Now, I will appoint, for

for you, if that is your desire.

19 J On the other hand, if you do not accept counsel, I will not
20

appoint it.

21

right to counsel in this proceeding, the same as you have a

22

constitutional right to counsel at the trial.

23

24
25

And I tell you

that you have a constitutional

Now, again, do either of you want counsel?
DAN LAFFERTY:

I appreciate acknowledg-

ing we have that right, but I'll accept counsel, I'll be

1

counsel, I'll represent myself.

2

THE COURT:

3

RON LAFFERTY:

No, I don't.

I don't

care to have counsel, either.

6
7

And, Mr. Ron

Lafferty?

4
5

Okay.

THE COURT:

All right, then, are you

ready to proceed?

8

RON LAFFERTY:

Yes.

9

DAN LAFFERTY:

Urn-hum.

10

THE COURT:

(Yes)

Now, I understand that Dr.

11

Groesbeck, who was one of the alienists who conducted the

12

examination pursuant to the Court's order and whose report

13

has been received and a copy of which report has been furnish-

14

ed to the defendants, and which report has been read by the

15

Court, is not available to testify or for cross examination

16

here today.

17

If either of you want to postpone this hearing,

18

so that Dr. Groesbeck can be

19

including being examined by any psychiatrists or psychologists

20

or other alienist, the Court would postpone it.

21

nature to that is to proceed without Dr. Groesbeck.

22

here, or for any other purpose

The alter-

Now, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Ron Lafferty, if

23

you want to proceed at this time or do you want additional

24

time to have Dr. Groesbeck available and, perhaps, also

25 1

Droduce . to be examined bv other nsvrhi a t ri <;f <5?

1

1

Jesus Christ has identified as positives.

2

a Mormon, or a Latter-day Saint, I can't acknowledge him to

3

be anything but anti-Christ.

4

to violate another First Amendment right, which I have, the

5

right to religious belief.

6

ment center and force me to believe as he believes , which is

7

anti-Christ, which is incidentally as far as his belief as

8

an infidel.

9

beliefs.

10

And although he is

And all he is trying to do is

He wants to put me in a treat-

And I have no desire to change my religious

And, I think that pretty well covers it.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Since you have been

12

talking about the waiver of right to counsel and in response

13

to my question, you've indicated that you felt that you could

14

and have made a knowing and intelligent decision with regard

15

to waiving your counsel.

16

the consequences or some of the reasons why you ought to

17

have counsel.

18

be it.

19

these things have been called to your attention prior to

20

this time.

21

But,

I want to point out to you some of

And then if your answer is still the same, so
I think you should know.

DAN LAFFERTY:

I'm not sure that

Frankly, each judge has

22

taken the time to do that.

23

that, I may have the right to explain to you the reasons I

24

think it would be to my disadvantage.

25

And I might ask if after you do

ThE COURT:

Yes.

Yes, I'll let you do

;
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1

it, pamphlet, and if you could erect that wall, you could

2

figure out, you could look at one, and you probably could

3

put some mortar in and put the bricks on top of each other

4

the way that they are supposed to be.

5

you getting the kind of a wall that you would get if you had

6

a bricklayer build the wall, are pretty slim.

7

that's true when you don't have counsel in a complex and

8

complicated trial, such as a capital case.

9

But, the chances of

And, I think

Now, there is an old addage, I don't know how old

10

it is, but there is an addage which says, that:

11

who represents himself has a fool for a client."

12

Do you know what that means, Mr. Dan Lafferty?

13
14

"A person

DAN LAFFERTY:

Yes.

I've heard it many

times.

15

THE COURT:

16

DAN LAFFERTY:

What does it mean?
It means that the person

17

who's made the statement is judging that the person who is

18

representing themselves is a fool.

19
20

THE COURT:

Okay.

means?

21

RON LAFFERTY:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

What do you think it

About the same thing.

About the same thing?

right.
Do you agree with it?
DAN LAFFERTY:

Absolutely, not.

All
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not.

2

RON LAFFERTY:

3

to have to within a day or two?

4

THE COURT:

You say that we are going

Make the decision, if you

5

want to reconsider.

6

counsel, then I'm going to require you to do so within the

7

next day or two.

8
9

If you want to reconsider and ask for

RON LAFFERTY:

Are you indicating that

you've already made up your mind concerning incompetency?

10

THE COURT:

No.

No.

No, I didn't mean

11

to imply that.

12

taking this in context that we'll assume that the trial,

13

some day that the trial is going to go forward, and that you

14

will want, you should want to be represented by counsel at

15

that time.

I meant, if the trial goes forward, and I'm

If not, even at this time, even at this time.

16

RON LAFFERTY:

Well, from the statement '

17

that you made, it was a pretty strong indication that you

18

had already made a judgment on this, perhaps even --

19

THE COURT:

20

RON LAFFERTY:

What was the judgment?

|

That we would be

21

found competent if we were going to go on to trial.

22

THE COURT:

23

\

Well, I have not, at this

point.

I

24

All right.

25

record so that I would be sure.

Those matters I wanted to put on the
I know that the other judges
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1

than you have had sofar.

2

THE COURT:

3

DAN LAFFERTY:

That's fine.
I, I just want to point

4

out that the only thing that I feel that's essentially

5

important is that you remain impartial, and that you be

6

judicious of constitutional principles, as you said you will.

7

And if you'll do that, I know that my judges, you'll repre-

8

sent, essentially, a referee, my judges will be a twelve-man--

9

THE COURT:

10

Jury.

DAN LAFFERTY:

--jury, of my peers.

11

They will be the judges.

12

areas I know this still doesn't hold true:

13
14

And clarify for me, because in some

If one individual in the jury finds us not guilty,
will you override that and find us guilty --

15

THE COURT:

16

DAN LAFFERTY:

17

No.

constitutional principles?

18

THE COURT:

19

DAN LAFFERTY:

20

--contrary to those

No.
So you still do hold

to the authority of a jury --

21

THE COURT:

If you are found guilty,

22

all twelve jurors, and there will be twelve, must find you

23

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

24
25

DAN LAFFERTY:
override that?

Right.

And you wouldn't

Till'
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1

safe, because --

2

THE COURT:

Well, don't feel that safe;

3

because there may be a difference of opinion as to what that

4

is.

5

RON LAFFERTY:

That's fair warning.

6

DAN LAFFERTY:

Well, that's where it

7

is.

Okay.

8
9

THE COURT:

That's why you may ought

to have counsel.

10

DAN LAFFERTY:

The reason I don't

11

believe it's necessary to have counsel, then, is because I

12

don't think there is anyone who can exaplin my point of

13

view more clearly to the jury.

14

THE COURT:

15

DAN LAFFERTY:

All right.
And as I explain it to

16

them, they can draw conclusions.

17

said counsel maybe incompetent, in fact, an attorney or a

18

representative of the law profession has the ability, then,

19

if I accept them to counsel to represent me, then they can

20

ignore much of anything I say and put forth what they feel.

21

Furthermore, an attorney is kind of under the gun and is not

22

allowed to say many things that I would personally say very

23

openly.

24

for example.

25

I've already done, many attorneys wouldn't even consider

Furthermore, I believe that

They wouldn't because of just of fear of disbarment,
I see in many instances, I know that many things
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voir dire examination of :••<-:• prospective

tl l a t m e a n s

the examination

of

them t o know

about

.

1

them, --

2

DAN LAFFERTY:

3

THE COURT: -- and so on, will be con-

4

ducted by the Court.

5
6

DAN LAFFERTY:

So the individuals can't,

the defendants can't --

7
8

I know what is it.

THE COURT:

In the presence of the

defendants, and in presence of counsel for the state.

9

The parties may submit voir dire questions to the

10

Court which they desire put to the prospective jurors.

11

Those questions will have to be in writing, and I'll give you

12

a date in which they have to be submitted.

13
14

As , there would be ten preemptory challenges for
each of you and ten for the state.

15

Now, preemptory challenges, and they will be

16

exercised on an alternate basis. And, the preemptory challenge

17

is a right to just simply excuse ten people for no reason at

18

all.

19

DAN LAFFERTY:

20

THE COURT:

21

Without cause.

Without cause.

Now, if we have alternate jurors, which I think

22

we might have, there would be two alternate jurors which

23

would make a total of 14.

24

have two additional challenges, so that you'd have twelve

25

rather than ten preemptory challenges.

And, then the each of you would
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1

defendant Ron Lafferty could waive his right to make such a

2

statement, or defer it until after the state has presented

3

evidence and rested.

4

have the right to make an opening statement.

5

wise, could waive his right to make that opening statement,

6

or defer it until after the state has presented its evidence

7

and rested.

8
9

The defendant Dan Lafferty would then
And he, like-

Then the next procedure in the trial would be the
presentation of the stated evidence.

The state would call

10

its witnesses.

11

both defendants would have the right of cross examination.

12

And after direct examination of each witness,

Again, I don't know why Ron and Dan are different

13

than why it should be first or second, but I guess that's

14

the way that it is in the Complaint or the Information, and

15

so that's the way I've used.

16

Ron Lafferty would have the right to cross examine

17

first, followed by Dan Lafferty who would cross examine

18

second.

19

of the defendants -- redirect examination of each of the

20

defendants.

21

cross examination in the same order as they did their cross

22

examination.

The state would then conduct reexamination of each
j

And then the defendants could then conduct re-

23

After that, after the presentation of the state's

24

evidence, if either or both of you had not waived your right

25

to opening statements, then either or both could make an

!

opening

statement
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1

Now, after that, after the instructions, the state

2

would make the first closing argument, to the jury; and then

3

the defendants, you, would separately make yours, in any

4

order that you choose to do so.

5

the right to close the argument.

6

Then the state would have

If the jury brought back a verdict of guilty of

7

murder in the first degree,

8

would be had.

9

reason of the verdict of the jury, it is anticipated that it

then a penalty phase hearing

And if that proceeding were necessary, by

10

would take place as soon after the verdict as is reasonable

11

practicable, having due regard to the circumstances which may

12

exist.

13

ments to have witnesses available for that purpose, at short

14

notice.

15

Then, the parties would have to make their arrange-

Now, do you

think that you can represent your-

16

selves in a proceeding if I made such an order as that?

17

Mr, Dan Lafferty?

18

DAN LAFFERTY:

19

THE COURT:

20

RON LAFFERTY:

21

THE COURT:

Lafferty?

Yes, sir, I think I

And would you abide by

whatever we come up with as the order of protocol procedure?

24
25

Mr. Ron

would.

22
23

I see no problem.

RON LAFFERTY:
ability, yes.

To the best of my
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Dr. Washburn,

would

you

1

0

And, you are a psychiatrist.

2

A

I'm a physician.

3

Q

Psychiatry.

4

spend together, doctor?

5

A

Oh, between an hour-and-a-half and two hours.

6

Q

Between an hour-and-a-half and two hours?

A

Yes.

8

Q

Were there any written examinations?

9

A

No.

7

!

Is that correct?

My specialty is psychiatry.

Approximately, how much time did we

There was no written examination, because

10

you declined any written evaluation or examination.

11

0

12

two hours together.

13

mainly, what?

14

A

We did a history-taking process.

15

0

A family history?

16

A

A family history, your history, and during that

17

process I was doing what we call an informal mental staff

18

examination.

19

Q

20

period, whatever time it was where we discussed pretty much

21

family history and then, evidently, you were watching for

22

some other signs, you were able to determine that I had "a

23

mental illness which has probably been present for a number

24

of years," to use your words, first of all; "and, secondly,

25

because of this mental illness it is my opinion Mr. Lafferty

So we spent approximately an hour-and-a-half to

Okay.

During that period of time we discussed,

So that your-and-a-half period, two-hour
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1

A

2

and setting up the formal hearing for today.

3

0

4

judge were present during this communication?

5

A

6

the hearing that you hadn't gotten to or missed --

7

0

8

else?

9

A

No.

10

0.

Okay.

11

source and encouraged you to come up with this kind of --

12

A

No.

13

0

- - a report?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Okay.

16

this kind of a conclusion in that short of a period of time?

17

A

Oh, yes.

18

Q

Are you?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

No, since Dr. Groesbeck isn't here, just let me

21

ask you a couple of questions.

22

answer for him or not.

23

same or comes to some of the same conclusions that you come

24

to.

25

He makes the recommendation that, he says that:

We had a brief discussion in terms of procedures

Okay.

So that the prosecution as well as the

This is the time that we had originally scheduled

Okay.

Did you discuss this matter with anyone

Has anyone influenced you in any way, Dr. Washburn?
This is completely independent.
No one had contacted you from another

Are you normally able to make a, come to

I don't know that you can

But, Dr. Groesbeck makes some of the

However, he makes an interesting recommendation here.
"It is

i

,

«-M;

< d,) *> w;

>

-i aw:-*

*

at

..',

i y j ^ u =
i> iJ

IS^II:

t

TUTlll

'UOTlsarit)

^. i

r

^>jbf

i^iw

;

' • ^fl

Ae>[0
*l % ^ ' ^ 9 /

) \ 0 a .1 J o 0 em 1 ;

(

' *;a JC ] s a i ! {

j ^ pcuad

pio,*\ 5i] } a s n

e 1 1 1 "e 1 ] ],. 31 1 a ui91 B ] s

a1j1

\ 1-, i1 n u i - M ^

j

t

isaop

"as m i a q .

§1 1 1: :i IJ

iiirjjoiuaoo
•

4l

pajujSdi

* -

h

0^4101

' s
paiO|Sc)i4i

aq

*

siM

1

uiri i a . ,

Ar n p p y ^

-

3 t up*[noM.
tj

^ B :jeq:j

> 11 ; si

<KJ i n . )

] t ? u i p u t ;s

o]

^auaiaciLi'O

J I aa*-

g
2

napuaumiona T

1

Yes.

Some mental illnesses do respond to treat-

2

ment within 60 days.

3

Q

4

Doctor?

5

A

6

of illness you are talking about.

7

of mental illnesses.

8

0

9

about here ?

What kind of treatment are we talking about,

Well, of course we have to depend upon the kind
There are many kinds

Well, what kind of mental illness are you talking

10

A

I vrasn't talking there.

11

Q

I'm talking about your report, now.

12

that there ' s a mental illness, too; --

13

A

Oh, yes.

14

Q

-- the mental illness has been present for years.

15

What kind of mental illness are you talking about there?

16

A

17

would be, a paranoid delusional state.

18

Q

A tentative diagnosis?

19

A

Yes, urn-hum.

20

0

Okay.

21

correct in a two-month period of time, restored?

22

A

23

want me to respond in terms of your original question:

24

mental illnesses respond to treatment?"

25

depending on the individual and the mental illness.

You indicate

The diagnosis, I would, a tentative diagnosis

And can that sort of a mental illness be

Prognosis would be guarded.

In terms of if you

Yes, many do,

"Gan

1

Q

2

estimation, be corrected in a two-month period of time in

3

one of these closed facilities?

4

A

5

asking the question of regaining competency, and also

6

responding in terms of treatment.

7

separate questions.

8
9

Can this particular mental illness, in your

You may be asking two questions.

You may be

That is actually two

A person may still have a mental illness and
still be competent to return to court.

10

Do you understand what I'm saying?

11

Q

Yes, I think I do.

12

A

Okay.

13

in process, the illness may still be in process of treatment, !

14

the person may along the way be able to return to court, in

15

terms of competency.

16

Q

17

treatment, you didn't recommend any kind of treatment.

18

A

No.

19

0

Is it your opinion that this mental illness is

20

something permanent and cannot be treated?

21

A

22

asked.

23

Q

That is your opinion, however.

24

A

I wouldn't offer an opinion at this point.

25

wasn't asked by a court to offer that opinion or render that

Okay.

So, that if the treatment still may be

Nov;, you didn't mention anything concerning

I haven't offered an opinion on that.

I wasn't

I

1

statement at this point.

2

time.

3

Q

4

make a comment prior to this or were you ever notified prior

5

to the time that you were asked to make this examination

6

that you might be making the examination?

7

A

8

order coming.

9

kinds of processes.

So, I would not offer it at this

And you mention, once again, that -- Did you ever

I was notified by telephone that there was an
That's how I'm usually notified of these

10

Q

11

making that order?

12

A

I'm not understanding your question.

13

0

Was that telephone call prior to the process

14

making the --

15

A

Oh, no.

16

0

Okay.

17

A

No.

18

teleohone that there's an order on its way in the mail.

19

Q

20

you from any organization, either religious, government or

21

otherwise trying to in any way influence you, Doctor, --

22

A

No.

23

Q

-- to come up with this kind of a --

24

A

No organization, no one.

25

independent.

I see.

Was that prior to the court process,

The order is done, and then I'm notified by

And you say that at no time did anyone contact

This is completely

1

Q

2

find someone incompetent, is this pretty much a standard

3

diagnosis?

4

Okay.

Is this pretty much a standard, when you

I guess I'm curious to know if you and Dr.

5

Groesbeck didn't talk at anytime or didn't communicate con-

6

cerning this matter.

7

A

8

were done.

9

Q

Vie did not talk

at all before the evaluations

I'm curious to know why the both came up with an

10

evaluation that's very, very similar.

11

a canned statement here or

12

A

13

similar conclusions.

No.

RON LAFFERTY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Do you have questions

Additional, Mr. Dan Lafferty?

18

DAN LAFFERTY:

19

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

BY MR. DAN LAFFERTY:

21

Q

22

is, please, Doctor?

23

I have no further

questions.

16
17

--?

I think we both independently came up with

14
15

Is this pretty much

Yes.

Could you describe for me what "expansiveness"

Yes.

It's in your report.

If I can put it into terms and phrases

24

you can understand:

25

a person becomes more and more thinking of, concerned with,

"Expansiveness" is an idea or concept

j

1

in two or three areas: yard maintenance, landscaping, con-

2

struction.

I was a carpenter for a few years.

3

THE COURT:

4

DAN LAFFERTY:

5

THE COURT:

6

Are you a journeyman?

Okay.

DAN LAFFERTY:

8

THE COURT:

12
13
14
15

Nothing that --

That bears upon the question

of competency to proceed?

10
11

Anything else you

want to state with regard to your background?

7

9

Yes.

DAN LAFFERTY:
think.

-- I was just trying to

I can't think of anything, offhand, I can't.
RON LAFFERTY:

I could add a few things

to that, if you'd feel it necessary, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, I'd be interested,

if you'd like to tell me.

16

RON LAFFERTY:

17

on the Highland City Council; was involved in the incorpo-

18

ration of the Highland area; was involved in politics even

19

long before that in trying to prevent the Highland area from

20

being incorporated; and then as we realized that we had no

21

choice, we were forced by the County to do otherwise, we were

22

incorporated, and I was involved; and I was asked to serve

23

on the first council and elected on the second.

24
25

I've served two terms

I've served a mission for the Latter-day Saints
Church; served in three bishoprics; and have been active, very

1

active in the Church for many, many years.

2

I have done a lot of carpentry work, buildings,

3

on my own, on the side.

4

built my own house, on the side.

5

work; if that's important,

6

a crane operator.

7

ment, not just crane;

I've built apartment houses; and
And, did a lot of mechanical

A lot of things other than just

And I've operated all kinds of heavy equipbut, mainly crane.

8

THE COURT:

9

I'm going to give you an opportunity to tell me why, in

Okay.

All right.

Now,

10

your opinion, you believe you are competent to proceed in

11

this case.

12

followed by Mr. Dan Lafferty.

And I'll let Mr, Ron

Lafferty go first, and then

And then I'll have the state

13 make a comment, whichever, however it wants me to view the
14 matter.
15

Okay.
RON LAFFERTY:

First of all, your

16

Honor, I'd like to say that I feel that I'm competent, mainly

17

because I have my own best interests at heart.

18

two years, I've allowed others to represent me in other areas.

Over the past

19 And I have been misrepresented, because people don't under20

stand where I come from, your Honor.

21

explain to them in detail why I would like to represent --

22
23

THE COURT:

And I've tried to

Do you think you might have

that same problem with a jury?

24

RON LAFFERTY:

25

THE COURT:

With a jury?

Yes.

1

RON LAFFERTY:

2

that I could do a better job of convincing a jury where I

3

come from myself, in fact I know that I could do better my-

4

self, than if I had someone else represent me.

5

that, many times; and people just don't understand; and I

6

have been able to explain first-hand where I come from, and

7

have had much better success in that than in having someone

8

else represent me.

9

I could have, but I think

I've tried

A great example of that was in my dealings with

10

my stake presidency, prior to my excommunication from the

11

Church.

12

a letter concerning constitutional law, quite frankly, I was

13

invited to write a letter to The First Presidency and to

14

President Benson, who I felt was qualified because of some

15

books that I had read that he had written.

16

ily stake president promised, I was invited to write

And, I wrote that letter, and I asked six ques-

17

tions, and I made them as simple as possible.

18

the letter on the basis that I was invited to write The

19

First Presidency, my stake president

20

that.

21

happy to, but that I wanted to write the letter; that I didn't

22

want him to represent me, in other words.

23

my own letter, and but I would be happy to send it through

24

the proper channels, I had nothing to hide, and he was wel-

25

come to read it.

And I wrote

had invited me to do

And I told him that I would like to, that I'd be

So, I did that.

I wanted it to be

|

1

Some months later the answer came back, and the

2

answer was totally and completely contrary to the writings

3

of Ezra Taft Benson.

And that disturbed me.

4

him a letter, and he

refused to answer my letter.

5

back to visit with the brethren there in the Church Office

6

Building.

7

to my stake president, that he had interpreted the way he

8

thought it ought to be written, had written his own letter.

9

And the answer that they had received was an answer to his

And so 1 wrote
I went

And I was told that my letter has been sent back

10

letter rather than my letter, the very thing that, you know,

11

I was trying to prevent.

12
13

THE COURT:

Now, why do you cite this

example?

14

RON LAFFERTY:

Well, I'm trying to

15

explain to you that no one is in a position to represent me

16

like I am.

17

understand?

I'm just giving you one example of this.

18

THE COURT:

19

RON LAFFERTY:

Do you

Not completely, but -Okay.

I'm just giving

20

one example of how I have been misrepresented in my beliefs.

21

I was misrepresented by a letter, written by my stake presi-

22

dent to The First Presidency.

23

were in answer to his letter and not my letter, and as a

24

result they didn't address my questions at all.

25

answers to other questions.

And the answers that came back

They were

And what he tried to do was

\

1

interpret my thinking, and ask questions concerning those

2

matters.

3

examples.

And that's just one example.

4

THE COURT:

There have been many

Do you have another example

5

as to why you believe that somebody else can, or that you,

6

why you believe that you can represent yourself better than a

7

skilled lawyer can do?

8

RON LAFFERTY:

Well, the only real good

9

answer I have, your Honor, is that I know that I have my own

10

best interests at heart; I know that it's my constitutional

11

right to represent myself; I know that I have the right to

12

the assistance of counsel, which in my opinion is exactly

13

what we have here.

14

United States Constitution, and that is that I have the

15

right to "assistance" of counsel,

16

And that's the exact wording in the

That doesn't mean that counsel takes my place

17

to speak.

18

assist me.

19

So I think the way we've got it set up here is exactly the

20

way the Constitution defines it.

21

THE COURT:

22

I still have the right to speak, and they can
And that's what these gentlemen have been doing.

Aside from the Constitution,

is that the way you want it?

23

RON LAFFERTY:

24

it, yes.

25

quite clear.

That's the way I want

I would like to represent myself.

I've made that

1

THE COURT:

2

the defendants are present in court with their standby

3

counsel, that the State of Utah is represented by Mr. Wayne

4

Watson and Mr. Noall Wootton.

5

The record will show that

Gentlemen, the Court has heard and observed the

6

defendants during a hearing which has lasted for approxi-

7

mately four hours, on two days, and has heard upwards I

8

think of ten witnesses, on the question as to whether or not

9

the defendants are incompetent to proceed with respect to

10

the information which has been filed in this case.

11

From the evidence presented and the Court's

12

observations of the defendants, and considering their re-

13

sponses to questions and statements made during the hearing,

14

the Court is unable at this time to find by either a pre-

15

ponderance or clear preponderance of the evidence, that the

16

defendants or either of them are incompetent to proceed, as

17

those two words are used in Section 77-15-2, Utah Code

18

Annotated,

19

The Court makes no finding with respect to whether

20

or not the defendants suffer from a mental disease or defect,

21

but does find that if either of them do so suffer, such

22

defect does not result to either of them in an inability

23

to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, or

24

the punishment specified for the offense charged, or in his

25

inability to assist counsel in his defense.

1

With regard to the defendants' repeated refusal

2

to obtain counsel or to accept appointment of counsel, by

3

the Court, it is the Court's conclusion, based upon opinions

4

of the United States Supreme Court, that a defendant may

5

waive his constitutional right to counsel and represent him-

6

self, even in a capital case, if he makes a knowing and

7

intelligent waiver.

8

finding that while I believe as a judge and a lawyer that it

9

is unwise for the defendants to represent themselves, that

10

they do not have the education, training and trial skills

11

to represent themselves as we LI as a lawyer might; neverthe-

12

less, both defendants know what they are doing, and they are

13

intellectually capable of making the waiver,

14

In this connection, it is the Court's

Accordingly, the defendants may each represent

15

himself at the trial, but his conduct must comply with the

16

court procedures and protocol.

17

fore indicated to the Court that they would comply with

18

court procedures and protocol to the best of their ability.

19

Both defendants have hereto-

The Court orders Michael Esplin and Gary Weight,

20

who have previously been appointed as standby counsel and

21

who have been present throughout this competency hearing and

22

available to the defendants, to be present at all stages of

23

subsequent proceedings before the Court in this matter, and

24

be available to render advice and legal services to the

25

defendants in connection with this matter upon their request,

I

1

to the same extent as i f they were retained for that purpose

2

by the defendants,

3

Now, with regard to the media, as I have pre-

4

viously explained to, a motion has been filed, previously

5

explained to counsel, the Court exercised its statutory

6

discretion to exclude from the courtroom all persons no t

7

necessary to the conduct of the proceedings, because I was

8

concerned about pre-trial publicity of evidentiary matters,

9

which might have had some affect on the defendants' Sixth

10

Amendment rights and to a fair trial.
And also I am concerned that there is a right of

11
12

privacy when it comes

13

of a person, especially when that issue is not being raised

14

by the person who is the subject of the inquiry; and that

15

that right also ought to be preserved; and I think p erhaps

16

the statutory, the reason that the Court can do that under

17

the statute, is perhaps for that reason, if all thin gs are

18

equal.

to inquiring into the mental condition

Now, after hearing all of the evidence, and now

19
20

having rendered my decision with regard to the fact that I

21

do not believe that the evidence shows the defendant s to be

22

incompetent to proceed, I do not believe that Sixth t Amendment

23

rights of the defendants would likely be violated by the

24

accurate and context reporting of the proceedings if done

25

responsibly.

Accordingly, if the defendants do not now

1

object, then I will authorize rny reporter, at media's expense,

2

to make a transcript of the proceedings which we have gone

3

through the past couple of days, and make a copy of that

4

transcript available to them.

5

And I want to ask you before that becomes an

6

order:

7

proceedings which have taken place here being reported?

Do you have any objection to the contents or to the

8

RON LAFFERTY:

(Shook his head no)

9

DAN LAFFERTY:

No.

10

THE COURT;

11

RON LAFFERTY:

12

THE COURT:

13

DAN LAFFERTY:

14

THE COURT;

Mr. Ron Lafferty?
No.

Mr. Dan Lafferty?
No.

That will be the order.

15

(Off the record,)

16

(WHEREFORE, the hearing was concluded and the

17
18

1

Court stood inrecess at 4:38 o'clock p.m., October 24, 1984.)
- - -

19

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

20

I, EDWARD V. QUIST, hereby certify that !

21

I am an official court reporter for the above-entitled court,

22

duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of Utah;

23

that on the 23rd and 24th days of October, 1984, I appeared

24 before the above-named court and reported the proceedings had
25

and testimony given in the above-entitled cause of action;

1

that the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 150, inclusive,

2

contain a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic

3

notes, as taken in the above-entitled hearing, to the best

4

of my ability.

5
6

Dated at Provo, Utah this 30th day of

'1 )

October, 1984.
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Edward V. Quist, CSR
License No. 71
310 County Building
Provo, Utah 84601

EXHIBIT 3

NOALL T. WOOTTON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
ROOM 107, COUNTY BUILDING
EROVO, UTAH 84601
TELEPHONE: 373-5510 ext. 320

""! ,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
-vsRONALD WATSON LAFFERTY and
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY,

PETITION FOR INQUIRY AS TO
COMPETENCY OF RONALD
WATSON LAFFERTY
Case No. 9309

Defendants.

The Petition of Jerry Scott respectfully shows:
1.

I am a lieutenant with the Office of the Utah County Sheriff.

I am

presently serving as Utah County Jail Commander.
2.

In that capacity I have under my direct supervision and control one

of the defendants in this action, Ronald Watson Lafferty. He has been
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail since August 17, 1984, and until
recently has been cooperative.
3.

On October 25, 1984, while engaged in a conversation, he physically

attacked me without provocation on my part.

He appeared to become irrational

and was physically out of control and did not appear to be mentally in control of
his faculties. We then temporarily held him in a holding cell.
4.

Subsequently when transferring him from the holding cell to another

cell tor security reasons he again, without provocation, physically assaulted
Deputy Casey Thacker.
5.

I am aware that he has been examined and a hearing has been

conducted under the provisions of Section 77-15-5 of the Utah Code but these
events have taken place since that time. Pursuant to Section 77-15-3(2) of the
Code referred to, in my capacity as a person having custody of Mr. Ronald Watson
Lafferty, I respectfully request the Court to again entertain this Petition
under the section referred to and that the Court consider it pursuant to the
provisions of Section 77-15-5 of the Utah Code.
Dated this

/

day of November, 1984.

VERIFICATION
Cones now your Petitioner, under oath, and states that he has read the
contents of the above petition and states that the allegations contained therein
are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
Dated this

/

day of November, 1

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me a Nota

day of

October, 1984.

NOTARY PUBLIC

/

Residing at:.
My Commission Expires:

p

~T Hci
da
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition for Inquiry as to
Competency of Ronald Watson Lafferty, was hand-delivered to defendants, Ronald
Watson Lafferty and Dan Charles Lafferty, at the Utah County Jail, and mailed to
Michael D^Esplin, Attorney for Defendants, at P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84601,
this Lcq
day of November, 1984.

EXHIBIT 4

PHILIP WASHBURN M.D.
MOUNTAIN VIEW PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC
39 Professional Way, Suite #2
PAYSON, UTAH 84651

465-2566
October 10, 1984
PHILIP WASHBURN M.D.
General Psychiatry

The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge
Fourth Judicial District Court
State of Utah
Provo, Utah
Re: Rrnald Watson Lafferty
Case /'9309

Dear Judge Bullock:
I did a psychiatric evaluation on Mr. Ronald Lafferty at the Utah
County Jail on October 5, 1984. Mr. Lafferty consented to, and was
very cooperative with, my psychiatric interview and social history review. Mr. Lafferty however, refused taking any formal written psvchiatric or psychological tests. As a result of this psychiatric interview and history review 1 have come to the following conclusions and
opinions: First; Mr. Ron Lafferty is currently suffering from a significant mental illness which has probably been present for a number of
years. Second; Because of this mental illness it is my opinion that
Mr. Lafferty is not competent to act in his own behalf as legal counsel
because this mental illness may in fact jeopardize his right to ail
the protection offered in the court processes. Third; Even if Mr.
Lafferty consents to the assistance of legal counsel he may not be competent to proceed with the court processes because of his mental illness.
During my psychiatric interview and informal mental status examination of Mr. Ron Lafferty 1 observed a number of signs and symptoms that
give us factual information of the presence of a significant mental
disorder. Mr. Lafferty showed a rather high energy level in his speech
with a general mood and affect consistant with a hypomanic state, however
his mood was labile with some periods of depressive feelings. There
was evidences of expansiveness, grandiosity and paranoid delusion systems.
Mr. Lafferty feels he has received direct revelation from God. The
paranoid delusions system is well-organized and involves government,
laws and the L.D.S. Church. This is a shared delusion system with his
brother, Dan Lafferty.
I have reserved the afternoon of October 15, 1984 for testimony
if needed.
7

„ S£n£erely,

P4*llip Washburn, M.D.

PW/sbw
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October 9, 1984
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court
Utah County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Attention Jim Hale
Sanity Administrator
Utah County
180 East Center Street
Suite 204
Provo, Utah 84601
Re:

Ronald Watson Lafferty—Competency to Defend Himself

Dear Judge Bullock:
IDENTIFYING DATA:
Ronald Watson Lafferty is a 42 year old, twice married, white male, born 9
November, 1941. Criminal case #9309.
REASON FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
Per your letter of October 1, 1984, you requested psychiatric evaluation as
to this individuals mental condition, in essence concerning his competency
to proceed, whether he understands the charges placed against him, the
possible punishments that could result from being convicted of those
charges, as well as his ability to assist counsel in his own defense, and
whether he has competency to waive counsel.
EXAMINATIONS PERFORMED:
This individual was reviewed in direct
October,1984 at the Utah County Jail.

psychiatric

examination

on 8

There were no medical or other reports for review. However, a brief reveiw
on the telephone was arranged with Wayne Watson, the Utah County
prosecutor.

22€

6 3 14

Ronald Lafferty
October 9, 1984
Page 2
DATA BASIC TO PSYCHIATRIC OPINION:
INTERVIEW: WAYNE WATSON, Utah County Prosecutor
He noted that there are multiple police reports concerning this case and
that the critical issues surround the request of this individual to waive
counsel, as well as to appreciate the charges and penalties. There are six
counts of first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated robbery. They
involve the wrongful death of a sister-in-law, Brenda, as well as her little
child. It is alleged that this killing was directed by God and by revelation.
It is briefly noted that these individuals were orthodox Mormons at one
time, and then, gradually, sought and believed different views and left the
Mormon Church by excommunication. They started their own "School of the
Prophets," a religious school for teaching more intense religous ideas
related to the Mormon religion.
Allegedly, this individual, Ron Lafferty, received a revelation that "Brenda
was interfering and would have to be removed." Two other people, a
woman, a religous leader, as well as a male religous leader with whom they
had been involved were also earmarked to be removed.
The brother of Ron, Dan believed the revelation.
The slashing of the throat of Brenda and the baby took place. It was
believed that Ron, the brother slashed Brenda, and Dan slashed the Child,
Erica.
They, then, went down the road to find a Richard Stowe, a Mormon church
leader. They couldnTt find his driveway, and allegedly one participant in the
group said "the Lord does not want this much killing today." Apparently,
Ron agreed with this and did not try any further. The other religious leader
was away from her home when they tried to find her.
It was noted that Dan had been convicted of aggravated assault and a
violent attack on a highway patrolman. He spent 45 days in the Utah State
Prison.
It was stated that of Dan when he was in jail that he may have been
borderline and may deteriorate in his psychological development.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
Central Nervous System:
He denies siezures convulsions, headaches, or passing out spells.
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Genital-urinary:
He had a kidney stone four years ago.
and one-half. It was quite painful.

He was in the hospital for one week

The rest of his exam was essentially unremarkable.
disease, diabetes, or cancer.

There is no heart

PAST PERSONAL HISTORY:
He was born and raised in the central and northern Utah area from Murray
to Salt Lake to Orem. He lived also in Payson in latter years, graduating
from high school there, and spent nearly one year at BYU. He was never in
the military. He worked as a contractor in heavy equipment.
He was raised by his natural parents. His
complications. This allegedly was not a
became ill. It was not difficult to get
mother was 65. There are two sisters
oldest. All are alive and well.

father died a year ago of diabetes
blow. People expected it when he
over it. The father was 69. The
and four brtohers, Ron being the

His first marriage was in 1963. It ended two years ago. His wife got the
divorce. There were six children ranging in age from two through twenty.
He denied ever practicing polygamy, though, he does believe in that
doctrine. He had no other wives simultaneously. He married a second time in
1984 for two months. Apparently, it did not work out. He divorced this wife
also. This was not a legal marriage. He feels the laws of the land do not
have the right to marry people. He feels that marriage is between a manfs
wife, himself, and God, and should not involve the state.
His first wife, as well as his second wife left because they thought his
thinking should have been controlled. He sees himself as L.D.S. but not
Mormon. He feels the Mormon Church is totally out of order. It does not
believe the doctrines taught by Joseph Smith. He feels "it is an imposter."
HISTORY OF PRESENT PROBLEM:
He is well aware of being charged with murder and conspiracy and
aggravated burglary. He described the victim as being as sister-in-law who
was 23 with a child 15 months of age. She was the wife of Allan, his
younger brother. He is aware that they died of a slashing death and
repeated the charges that have been made known to him in the courtroom.
He stated today that he has been charged with involvement; in fact, all
four of them have. He, his brother, another Richard Knapp, and a fellow
named Chip Kearns who has turned state's evidence and currently, has now
had his charges dropped.
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He states all these charges are false;
totally false. He stated that they are
alleges the crime occurred. He will
states that they will lie, cook up false

all of them against his brother are
guilty of no crime. He says the state
go to court and defend himself. He
charges.

He is upset that they are locked up in separate cells and have been for so
long. He states that the state fears that they will concoct a story together.
Yet, they were there together two weeks prior to coming to jail.
He refuses to accept anyone to help him in his defense because he feels
that all counsel, lawyers, etcetera sleep in the same bed as a part of the
same corrupt legal system. Therefore, he wants to represent himself.
He relates this intrusion control with the Mormon Church who has infringed
upon his marriage, his family, and behind his back. He feels they tried to
control his thinking and has encouraged his wife to leave. They also
allegedly controlled his second wife. He made no distinction between the
legal system and the Mormon Church.
He was very angry that he had given all to his wife and urged her not to
involve the legal process. She did, both with the courts and the church and
he was extrememly upset. They took everything, excommunicated him from
the Mormon Church. He was extremely upset. He denied ever cheating on
his wife, going with any other woman. He devoted himself totally to her and
the children. He tried to support constitutional law and he quoted Mormon
leaders as his byword and yet, he was turned away. He felt that his
children were misused by the Mormon Churhch. Justice was not carried out.
He states that the only way they could get on him was the way he thought.
He was most upset at the state giving the custody of the children to his
wife. He thought it was very unfair since he had been so reasonable.
He desribed a long, involved procedure with his church official who presided
over him that he alleged deceived him in his relationship to the high level
leaders of the Mormon Church with whom Mr. Lafferty felt a great kinship
in their writings. He quickly then bridged that without distinction to
deceptiveness in the criminal justice system in general.
In terms of the court and comprehending its proceedings, he could outline
very quickly and easily the functions of the judge, prosecuting attorney,
and the defendant, jury, and then, could very clearly and articulately
describe how serious the charges were that are placed against him, and it
could lead to life imprisonment or death.
In terms of ability to advise counsel, he indicated again he would be his
own counsel. He has studied procedures, state statues and he has been
through several legal proceedings. He 'defended himself in the preliminary

Ronald Lafferty
October 9, 1984
Page 5
hearing and allegedly received a comment from a prosecutor that he missed
his calling as an attorney. He has never read much on murder legally.
His mode of defense of self would be to not enter into legal matters but to
challenge the court on a spiritual basis. He has already done that in that
Judge Ballif has stated that the court had no jurisdiction over spiritual
matters, and therefore, Mr. Lafferty has declined to put in a plea for the
court. In fact, he feels that the court has no jurisdiction over his problems
by its own admission. He stated that God was a part of the consitution
originally and why isn't it now.
He describes specifically his revelation that he received, one of many. It
was a revelation in which individuals who are allegedly killed were "to be
removed." They were his sister-in-law, Brenda, her daughter, and two
others. The Mormon Church officials, Mr. Stowe, and a woman named Lowe.
He described reveiving this revelation as "flow of intelligence in the mind.
It's sweet and itTs expanding." He uses these terms referring to traditional
Mormon literature as the way one receives a revelation from God. He also
stated artists and those who make music can also create revelations.
He stated there is no question this came from God. He has no doubts about
it.
Further, he stated in harmony with good Mormon practice, he would never
just act alone and so he submitted this revelation to the "School of the
Prophets." This was a small group of committed, intense Mormons who had
been involved in leaving the orthodox Mormon Church and who were
studying spiritual matters. This consisted of Bob Crosfield, the prophet,
President Berry Crowthers, and then others members including himself,
brother Dan, brother Mark, brother Tim, and two others. He stated they all
confirmed that the revelation was from God. He denied that anyone had set
any dates, and in what manner the removal would be. Only that it would be
as soon as possible. He felt that it was "in the Lord f s hands as to how it
would be done." He declined to discuss this much further.
He stated he has followed legal procedures in trying to meet with these
charges.
He is extremely upset that he feels that the legal system puts procedures
above truth. He states that if they beat him, he will warn them of the
injustice, and then, it is their responsibility. They will have to answer to
God. He denied that he wanted to take the law into his own hands or that
this meant that he would actually try to harm or do something to bring this
about.
He also warned the interviewer that he would held accountable for things
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that were being testified of as far as the knowledge that he gave. He would
not premeditate anything and any actions.
He stated that if they wanted him he would "take the death penalty
calmly." He feels he would have paid "the price to his God and that it is
fair and that he will be just in dealing with him."
He denied suicidal or homicidal feelings. He denied he had harmed or killed
anybody.
He prays daily. He feels God is happy with him in his eyes.
He then went on to describe a number of prophecies related from Mormon
literature about the last days.
In terms of susceptibility to decompensation, he noted that he handled
himself a day and one-half in court. He was calm. He does not feel he will
break down or have great difficulties.
He again noted that the death penalty would be the Lord!s will and it would
be his will if things turn out that he didn't win. He has no predisposed idea
of who will win. He will, though, try to work to make his life go on because
he should live. He feels "the Lord could interfere with the whole process by
opening the door and changing the whole legal process, having an angel
come and confound those involved." He quoted scripture precedence for that
from the Mormon scriptures.
He stated that he could testify for himself very strongly.
In terms of having counsel assist him, he stated he would absolutely not
accept it. If they forced him to have counsel, he would not cooperate in
any way. He feels he would be denied a constitutional right.
He describes using drugs, marijuana on a couple of occasions, drinking a
beer occasinally, but otherwise, never being involved in drugs or alcohol.
He denies sexual attacks, attacking others. He denies homosexual conflicts.
He has never been robbed, beaten, or had any specific attacks made on him.
His final plea to the court is that he is qualified and feels they must decide
on whether this revelation is from God or not. He has a method where they
could find out, using a time honored Mormon means of quoting religious
scripture of the Mormons, the Book of Mormon, which indicates that if one
prays to God, one will get an answer as to whether something is true.
He states they could also go to a California computer scripture program and
compare his revelation to others. He -feels that is the most important
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mission of the court to decide on that revelation.
He refuses to play games.
being forced in to it.

He feels the courtroom is a big game and he is

MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION:
He is a tall, bearded with blondish hair, mainly brown, white male, who
came in rather defensively stating that he was not going to go over the
same interviews that had been done with Dr. Washburn. This reflected some
fear of involvement and engendered some feelings of anxiety in the
interview.
However, he began to decrease that anxiety and to talk more freely and, in
fact, did cooperate with the interviewer marginally. Throughout the
interview, he would pull back, move about a bit and very quickly and
incitefully avoid discussing questions that could incriminate him surrounding
the charges that have been placed against him.
In the beginning of the interview, he was given notice that he should feel
free to not discuss any questions he felt not comfortable with because pf
the nature of the examination that would go to the court. He understood
this and accepted it.
He was alert throughout the interview. He was oriented fully to time, place,
and person. He knew well the events of the day. He knew what he had for
breakfast. He talked about the presidential debates in the United States the
previous night. He talked quite responsibly and appropriately and knew what
had happened.
He also talked about
authoritatively.

many aspects of L.D.S. or Mormon history

quite

His concentration was good. He did serial twos making only a couple of
errors. He abstracted proverbs well, though they were somewhat concrete.
His intellectual level appeared to average or above.
Perceptually, there was no evidence of frank hallucinations, or illusions. He
described having good dreams, usually, a peaceful experience with his
children, uniting with them. He denied any disburbing dreams.
His sleep has generally been good, going to bed at ten, getting up at
six-thirty. He awakens thinking of wanting to be with free men and be
treated equally.
Affect revealed an individual with rigid controls, much suspiciousness, and
with a marked sense of denial of the seriousness of his condition, although,
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verbally and intellectually he could state these things.
Anxiety level varied a great deal. There does not appear to be any
evidence of depression. There was no suicidal or homicidal ideation. He
appeared quite cooperative and apparently, the people in jail are not
frightened of him.
His thought processes were sequential and in tact. There was no evidence
of tangentiality. However, there was clearcut evidence of disturbed thought
processes in his reasoning. There was paranoid elements with clearcut
erection of a paranoid psuedo-community, a tendency to markedly project
on significant objects about him, a tendency to see the world as it slighted
him, only in his terms. For example, he saw the Mormon Church and all the
legal system, in a sense, in the same category with marked evidence of
thought process over inclusion indicating serious disturbance. His uncritical
attitude toward alleged revelations are deviant and not in accord with usual
beliefs within the culture group that he represents. Therefore, it would
have to be considered that there is clearcut serious delusional thinking
present. There is marked unresolved anger toward authority officials with
great ambivilance in how they have dealt with him. At times there was
almost a murderous feeling showed forth in these brief moments as he
described them.
DIAGNOSIS:
Axis I 297.10: Paranoia chronic—Manifested by persistent delusions of
persecution, enraged feelings of being hurt and destroyed by significant
authority, and other familial figures. Dependency is strong, identification
with religous beliefs, and a paranoid psuedo-community. The building of this
condition has been developing for several years.
Axis II 301.00: Paranoid personality disorder—Manifested by expectations
of trickery or harm, hypervigilance, avoidance of blame, questioning loyalty
to others, hypersensitivity, feelings of being cold and distant.
Axis III: No specific physical illnesses at this time.
PSYCHIATRIC OPINION:
1. Does this individual suffer a mental disease or defect which renders him
unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, or the
punishments specified for the offense charged?
The answer to that question is yes. This individual does suffer a serious,
chronic, pervasive growing longterm illness described as paranoia which has
as its core a serous delusional system, particularly, being persecuted by
others. Through it all, he also erected d paranoid psuedo-community that is
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about him.
Though he does comprehend the nature of the proceedings taken against him
and the charges, it is doubtful in this examinees mind that he grasps the
seriousness of the punishment that could be leveled against him. He blandly
puts this off with his religious system that, since he is at peace with his
maker, that would be no problem to accept it. It is doubtful that this
individual has emotionally seen the gravity and far reaching complexity of
looking at the death penalty, for example, or considering the charges placed
against him. There is too much denial and grandiose denial and exaltation of
his position.
2. Does this individual suffer from mental disease or defect which would
render him unable to assist counsel?
The answer to that question is yes. Currently, he is vehemently opposed to
having any counsel help him. He feels he can represent himself. His
delusional system is so pervasive that he feels that the whole legal system
which is combined with the Mormon Church is only filled with deception
and corruption and therefore, he will have no part of it. He would resist
participating in that counsel at this time. Therefore, it is this examiner's
opinion that he would not be able to assist counsel. He does not have a
reasonable as well as a rational understanding in terms of being able to
assist counsel.
3. Does he suffer from mental disease or defect which renders him unable
to make a knowing and intelligent decision with reference to waiving his
right to counsel?
The answer to that question is yes. It is felt that his mental illness at the
current time, essentially, limits his being able to knowingly and intelligently
decide about defending himself and waiving the rights of counsel. It is true
this individual has apparently conducted himself quite well allegedly in the
first hearings, but it is clear that he has very little knowledge of all the
complexities of defending himself against the death penalty. It is clear in
his reasoning now concerning the court that it is based on his delusional
system and has profoundly confused spiritual versus legal matters and how
they should be obtained.
He has no comprehension of the risks versus benefits of attempting to
defend himself. Therefore, in the end, the trial process would be a mockery
as he would be woefully lacking in the necessary skills to take care of a
proper defense for him. His grandiosiyty and identification with God and the
inability to separate spiritual from legal matters suggest a serious deficit in
his reality testing.
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It is recommended that this individual be confined for a sixty day
evaluation and treatment at a closed treatment facility to see if
competency to stand trial can be restored.
Sincerely yours^

C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D.
Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
CJG:mr

EXHIBIT 5

Scott M M a t h e s o n Governor State of Utah
Norman G A n g u s E x e c u t i v e Director

Social Services

January 22, 1985

Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge
Utah County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
RE:

Ronald Watson Lafferty
Case No. 9309

Dear Judge Bullock:
We have completed our evaluation of Ronald Watson Lafferty whom you
committed to this hospital on January 2, 1985 for an evaluation and a
report to the Court as stipulated in the Utah Code Annotated 77-15-3.
Our evaluation has consisted of multiple psychiatric interviews, physical
examination, psychological assessment, Halstead-Reitan Psychoneurological
Examination, electroencephalogram, computerized tomographic brain scan,
neurological evaluation, review of collateral information, observation
of his functioning in the treatment setting and presentation before the
clinical staff. It should be noted that we completed an extensive 22-day
in-patient evaluation of this individual on November 27, 1984.
During this evaluation, we have seen signs of diffuse organic brain
damage (of the dimentia type), which is consistent with his apparent
attempted suicide by hanging, which occurred on December 29, 1984. This
brain damage was clearly not present during our previous in-patient evaluation. The organic brain damage we have seen is characterized by.
confusion, decreased intellectual functioning, both short-term and longterm memory impairment, decreased psycho-motor activity, disturbed sleep
wakefulness pattern, decreased abstract thinking abilities, altered
affect, and inability to perform certain purposeful behaviors. During
this hospitalization, there has been gradual and progressive improvement
in each of these features. We are unable to predict at this time to what
extent his mental state will ever improve and approach normalcy, and are
unable to predict at what rate he will continue to improve.
We find at this time he lacks the ability to comprehend the nature
of the charges against him and the punishment specified for the offense
charged and lacks the ability to either meaningfully assist his counsel
in his defense, or to realistically conduct his own defense.

State Hospital
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Page Two
Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge
January 22, 1985

It is therefore, our recommendation that the Court commit Ronald
Watson Lafferty to the Utah State Hospital as "not competent to stand
trial1' and order that he receive psychiatric treatment. We have specifically considered various treatment alternatives, and feel that in-patient
care at the State Hospital would provide the best combination of security
and protection along with expeditious treatment and professional observation.
Sincerely yours,

7
Peter Heinbecker, M.D.
Clinical Director Forensic Psychiatry

LM

Van 0. Austin, M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist

Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D.
Medical Director
VOA/hh
Enclosures:

Psychiatric Evaluation
Psychological Evaluation
Social History
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Assessment
Computerized Tomographic Brain Scan

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION

D a t e

° f Evaluation J.,m,.,ry 21, 1985_

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY
INTRODUCTION:
On January 21, 1985, 1 evaluated Ron Lafferty in his room at the Utah State
Hospital. At that time, he appeared to be somewhat gaunt and thin as compared
to his previous admission to our hospital. He was oriented to time and place,
and his intellectual functioning appeared superficially to be intact. He stated
that he was eating well and sleeping well and that he generally felt well.
He
denied any symptoms of depression or thoughts of suicide. Also, he denied any
symptoms of psychosis such as hallucinations or paranoid ideas. He believed,
however, that he was following the dictates of n the good Lord".
He denied that
he had killed anyone and seemed to have a somewhat resigned attitude toward
his upcoming trial. He said that he felt that the judge and the lawyers knew
that he was not guilty, but if they wanted to convict him and execute him,
that
it would happen. Although he is obviously somewhat fanatical in his religious
beliefs, and has based his life on these fanatical beliefs
in the last few
years, it was not possible for me to say that he was psychotic during our interview.
At the time of his admission, Ron Lafferty had been confused in that he felt he
had never left the Utah State Hospital. He was disoriented as to time by 10 years.
However, during my interview on January 21, 1985, he did understand the approximately correct date and the correct year. He complained, however, of memory
lapses. He said that he could not remember attempting suicide and could not
imagine that he would have done such a thing. He did not remember being in the
Utah Valley Hospital whatsoever. His first memory, he said, was of entering our
hospital.
1 asked him about the charges against him, and he had a general understanding that he was charged with the murder of Brenda and Erica Lafferty.
However, he said that his memory for details was poor. He stated that he did not
recall clearly the events of July 2 4 , 1984, although he had some general memory
of what had happened.
During our conversation, he seemed quite angry about the
intrusion of other people, such as Chloe Low, in his family affairs and said at
one point
that this wouldn't have happened if Chloe Low had minded her business.
DIAGNOSTIC
Axis I:
Axis II:
Axis III:

IMPRESSION:
Manic depressive illness
Anti-social traits, paranoid traits, and narcissistic
Dimentia and also organic amnestic syndrome

traits

^eter Heinbecker, M.D.
Clinical Director Forensic Psychiatry
PH/hh
Dictated:
Typed:

1/22/85
1/22/85
• 0^

• H STATE HOSPITAL

: :
C

P.;.NS >

/56

P . ••! 'fc«• • " * : -w .S D

9 0 0-0.-:

C

A. L. CARLISLE, PH.D
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
730 EAST SCENIC DRIVE
PROVO, UTAH 84604

NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

CI ient:
Date of Birth:
Age:
Date of Assessment:
M a r i t a l Status:

Ron Lafferty
11-4-41
43
1-11-85, 1-12-85
Divorced

Examiner:

A. L. C a r l i s l e , Ph.D
C l i n i c a l Psychologist

Assessment Procedures:

Wechsler Adult I n t e l l i g e n c e Scale - Rev,
(Given by Dr. Robert Howell)
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test
Battery i n c l u d i n g the f o l l o w i n g :
Category Test
Tactual Performance Test
Seashore Rhythm Test
Speech-Sounds Perception Test
Finger O s c i l l a t i o n Test
Reitan-Klove T a c t i l e Farm Recognition Test
Reitan-Klove Sensory Perceptual Exam
T a c t i l e Finger Recognition Test
F i n t e r - t i p Number W r i t i n g Test
T r a i l Making Test (A and B)
Strength of Grip Test

Interview
Referral Source:

Dr. Robert J. Howell
Utah State Hospital

Presenting Problem:
Mr. Lafferty is presently in the State Hospi tal because he attempted to
hang himself while in the County Jail. It is repo rted that when he was found
he was not breathing and his heart was not beating . His life was saved through
the quick action of a guard and he was transferred to the State Hospital. After
the attempt it was noted that he had difficulty wa Iking and another person had
to help him eat. There was some slight slurring i n his speech. His affect was
bland and he would sleep a lot. He also showed si gnificant confusion and memory
loss. For example, he would show concern for the fact that his wife was not
visiting him in spite of the fact that they were d ivorced. Dr. Howell reports
an occasion where he had significant difficulty in trying to put on his pants
and became very confused in his attempt.
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He was given a Neuropsychological Assessment to help determine the presence of organicity and the severity of such if it is there.
Background Information:
Only a brief history was obtained because a more complete history is already
available through other interviewers.
Ron stated that he lived in Murray for the first few years of his life and
then moved to other areas in Salt Lake and then to Mt. Pleasant. He then moved
to Payson where he started the eighth grade and continued in school until he
graduated from high school. He comes from an intact family. He said his father
passed away a year ago from diabetes at the age of 60. He has five brothers and
two sisters whose ages range from 40 years to 27 years. His father was a chiropracter. He said that he had a good relationship with both of his parents.
Ron indicated that he had no particular problems during his childhood nor
teenage years. He graduated from high school and spent six months in the National Guard. He went on an LDS Mission to Florida and then returned and went to BYU
for a year.
He got married on July 5, 1962. He said that he was not positive whether
or not his wife had followed through on obtaining a divorce but he said that he
had given her a bill of divorcement about one year ago. He has six children
whose ages range from nine to 21 years.
Regarding prior potential neurological problems, Ron said that when he was
younger he often had headaches on Sundays. He also stated that when he was in
the fourth grade he had an accident with a piece of equipment which knocked him
out for a short period of time. He has had no seizures and he does not remember
any significant neurological problems in the past.
Assessment Results:
Ron was relatively quiet but was cooperative throughout the testing. He
seemed to try hard to succeed on the tests and the results are felt to be valid.
The WAIS-R was given to him in November and again on January 11th of this
year. In November he obtained a Verbal IQ score of 118, a Performance IQ score
of 111 giving him a Full Scale IQ score of 117. The current WAIS gave him a
Verbal IQ score of 98, a Performance IQ score of 90 giving him a Full Scale IQ
score of 95. The subtests indicate that the greatest change occurred where concentration, confusion and judgment are concerned.
On the Halstead-Reitan Battery he had significant problems with the Category
Test, with total time and localization on the TPT Test and with the Speech-Sounds
Perception Test. He also scored within the brain damaged range on both parts of
the Trail Making Test.
Overall, these results would suggest that there are problems with his
intellectual functioning. He does become confused and has difficulty performing
tasks that he could perform prior to the hanging incident. This seems to be
affecting his memory and his judgment.
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Further review of the data would suggest that possibly the left frontotemporal area may be involved. On the TPT Test he was much slower with his right
hand than with his left. He is also slower with his dominant hand on the Finger Tapping Test and the Strength of Grip Test. On the Sensory-Perceptual Examination
he had difficulty feeling the stimulus on the back of his right hand because he
said that it was numb. He doesn't remember this hand having been numb in the past.
When asked to indicate which finger was touched (with his eyes closed) he made
four errors with the right hand and one error with the left hand. The Finger-tip
Number Writing Perception Test indicated three errors on the right hand and one on
the left.
Summary:
The overall results indicate current loss of intellectual functioning, confusion and loss of memory. Regarding the latter, when asked his age, he said he
was 36 years old. He couldn't explain the discrepancy between that and the age
calculated from his birth date. It is felt that this deficite and confusion
could interfere with his ability to cooperate adequately with an attorney or to
adequately represent himself or his interests in court. It is recommended that
time be allowed for further restoration of potential intellectual abilities.
Diagnostic Impression:

294.10 Organic Brain Syndrome, Dementia

A.L. Carlisle, Ph.D.
CIinical Psychology
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IDENTIFYING INFORMATION: Ron Watson Lafferty, a 43-year old,
divorced, Caucasian male is currently experiencing his second
admission to the Utah State Hospital. His current weight is
139 pounds and he stands 5'10" tall. He was formerly admitted
to the Utah State Hospital on November 5, 1984 and was discharged
November 27, 1984, having completed a competency evaluation. The
conclusion of that evaluation was that he was competent to stand
trial. The reason for this admission is for another competency
evaluation.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: The information for this social history
update has been obtained from the Court, Utah Valley Hospital,
Utah County Sheriff's Department, and from observation of the
patient while experiencing his current hospitalization.
REASON FOR READMISSION: Mr. Lafferty was admitted to the hospital
for a second evaluation on January 2, 1985 after having made a
suicide attempt on December 29, 1984, having attempted to hang
himself with his t-shirt around his neck and attached to a towel
rack. The results of tfiis attempted suicide were that he was
found in an unconscious condition and assessed at that time to
have no heart beat, nor was he breathing on his own. Immediate
C.P.R. procedures were implemented and by the time the paramedics
had arrived, it is reported that his heart was beating on its own,
but that he required oxygen resuscitation. He was rushed from the
Utah County Jail to the Utah Valley Hospital, where he was admitted
under critical condition. There were concerns that due to the
amount of time he was unconscious and without respiration or
heartbeat, that there was a possibility of brain damage. An EEG
that was done on January 2, 1985 prior to his admission to the
Utah State Hospital from the Utah Valley Hospital was interpreted
as being severely abnormal because of diffused slowing of the
background frequencies. That possibly could mean metabolic,
infectious, tramatic, or vascular etiology. A Cat Scan was also
done, and it was found to be normal.
Due to the suicide attempt, the possibility of brain damage, the
results of the EEG, the appearance of lack of memory loss, and
also difficulties in motor control, it was determined by the Court
that another competency evaluation should be done. This evaluation
began on January 2, 1985 and should be completed on January 23rd.
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Readmission Note, continued:
Ron Watson Lafferty

INFORMATION RELATIVE TO EARLIER ADMISSION: Mr. Lafferty was admitted to the
Utah State Hospital for the first time on November 5, 1984, having been charged
with six felony counts. Two of these counts were first degree murder in the
slaying of his sister-in-law, Brenda Lafferty, and her daughter. The other criminal
counts included breaking and entering and conspiracy to kill others. The results
of that evaluation were that he was found competent to stand trial on all counts
and was returned to the Utah County Jail by the Utah County Sheriff's Department.
While in jail, on December 29, 1984, he made a suicide attempt by hanging himself.
Due to that event and the possible damage that the cardiac arrest and the lack of
oxygen may have caused, we are currently making another competency assessment.
PERTINENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
November 28, 1984.

Please refer to prior social history dated

ASSESSMENT OF SUICIDE ATTEMPT: On December 29, 1984, Ron attempted to commit
suicide by hanging himself. He hooked his t-shirt, which was around his neck, over
a towel rack and then lifting his own legs off the floor, suspended himself until
he rendered himself unconscious, at which time the full weight of his body continued
to hang. The actual time hanging is unknown. When he was discovered and reported
by his brother Dan, the Sheriff's Officers which responded found him to be unconscious
with no respiration or heartbeat. There had been enough loss of muscle control that
he had urinated on himself and mucous had been released from his nose. Immediately,
C.P.R. was rendered initially by the police officers and then after a few moments,
by a nurse from the mental health in-patient unit next door to the jail. This
continued until his heart was beating on its own and the paramedics had arrived.
After the arrival of the paramedics, oxygen was provided and he began to breathe on
his own also. He was immediately rushed to the Utah Valley Hospital where he
was put in intensive care and closely observed until his condition stabilized.
The incident leading up to the hanging seemed to gradually escalate over a period
of about a week. Just the week prior to his hanging himself, he began to become
aggitated and claimed to be being possessed by an evil spirit. This aggitation
was confirmed by his brother and by the jailers who observed him. On December 28,
Friday, he went to Court for a trial date to be set. After the date had been set,
and he had been returned to jail, his aggitation increased to a point that he
attacked Dan, his brother, severely enough that Dan was bleeding from the attack.
Through that night, he became more depressed, was eating very limitedly, but unable
to maintain a fast for any extended period of time. Due to the inability to control
his fasting, he became more discouraged and finally, on the day in question, was
aggitated enough that Dan was placed in an adjoining cell with the function of
observing him. During that time, the jailers had occasion to need to talk with Dan
and while Dan was gone, Ron made the suicide gesture. When Dan returned from being
interviewed by the jailers, he found him hanging.
He remained in Utah Valley Hospital after the hanging from December 29th to January
2nd, being closely observed medically as well as having two officers from the
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Readmission Note, continued:
Ron Watson Lafferty

Utah County Sheriff's Department maintaining surveillance.
Initially, he was
comatose for the first day and a half, and then regained consciousness.
After
regaining consciousness, he appeared to have lost memory, was out of touch with
reality, and had poor motor control. Enough progress was noted in the Utah Valley
Hospital, however, they felt that he needed to be placed at the State Hospital
for evaluation and better security. On January 2, 1985, he was transported to
the Utah State Hospital, at which time he was noted to not be able to walk without
assistance, and had great difficulty in recognizing individuals and people by name.
He had poor recall relative to the immediate past including the last three or four
year.s, in addition to no memory at all to the hanging incident.
Since his admission,
he has slowly progressed and seems to have gained good control of his physical
mobility and the memory loss seems to be returning a little at a time.
POSSIBLE DISCHARGE PLANS: Due to the patient's current condition, it is recommended
that he is not ready to stand trial and should be found incompetent.
He should then
be returned to the Utah State Hospital for continued treatment and observation until
competency can be restored. At that time, he should be referred to the Court for
disposition relative to his criminal case.
CURRENT PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSESSMENT: The patient, since his admission to the hospital,
has shown slow steady progress with a return of physical mobility as well as
memory loss. Currently, due to inconsistencies in his EEG and Cat Scan, and due
to a 20 point lower score on his I.Q. performance, the patient at this time does not
appear to be competent to stand trial. Further neurological work-up and readings
of his EEG need to be done. It would appear at this point that there is organic
brain damage, with possible dymentia.
It is, therefore, recommended that he be
continued at the Utah State Hospital for treatment, close observation to determine
if he will improve sufficiently to become competent to stand trial.

Robert A. VervT'lTe, MSW/CSW
Administrative Director
Forensic Security Unit 56
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Date Of Assessment January 4, 1985

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

January 5, 1985
January 6, 1985
January 11, 1985

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY

REFERRAL SOURCE:
REFERRAL QUESTION:
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES:

Fourth Judicial District Court
Competency to proceed
Interview of patient
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

INTRODUCTION: Ronald Lafferty is a 43-year old, divorced Caucasian male who is
5*10" in height and at time of admission, his weight was listed at 155 pounds, but
this was probably taken from his first admission at the hospital which occurred
from November 5, 1984 to November 27, 1984. I think he had lost significant amount
of weight during the intervening time. He was admitted January 2, 1985 after having
made a suicide attempt on December 29, 1984 by putting his t-shirt around his neck
and attaching the t-shirt to a towel rack and hanging himself. An EEG was done on the
day of admission. I do not see the report of this EEG. However, another one was
done on January 2, 1985 and it was interpreted as being a severely abnormal EEG
because of diffuse slowing of the background frequencies and indicated that the
tracing was consistent with diffuse encephalopathy of metabolic, infectious, traumatic
or vascular etiology. A CT scan was done. A date is not listed. It was found to
be normal.
When Ron first came to the hospital, he had difficulty in walking and had to be
assisted. As indicated, I saw him on January 4, 1985 briefly. He recognized my
name at that time, but did not know what the date was and he thought that Richard
Nixon was President. He knew he had been at this place before, but he was not sure
what it was. In general, he showed very indifferent affect that is often seen in
frontal lobe hypoxic patients. I saw him briefly on Saturday, January 5th, 1985, and
was here when he was visited by his mother, and an aunt and uncle who live in Sandy.
The next day, Sunday, January 6th, 1985, I asked him if he had visitors yesterday.
He responded that he knew he had visitors but he couldn't tell me who they were. On
a number of occasions, he told me that his younger brother, Tim, had been to visit
him, but never came up with his mother and aunt and uncle's names. Also, on Saturday,
January 5th, 1985, when I was there, he was trying to get dressed and for a number
of minutes continued to try to put his head through the armhole of his t-shirt, and
did not seem to recognize that things weren't: working just right. He then continually
got distracted in pulling his pants up. Both of these I interpret as indicative of
a organic brain syndrome.
He has improved and today, January 11, 1985, he told me that his aunt and uncle had
been to visit him just yesterday, when in fact it was on January 5th. He was much
more stable on his feet and his affect has improved. He allowed us to give him the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale revised edition when he was here in November and
December. On this test, he achieved a verbal I.Q. of 118, a performance or non-verbal
I.Q. of 111, and a full scale I.Q. of 117. Today I repeated this test. He remembered
having taken the test before. There was a lot more scatter in the test than there had
been before. He obtained a verbal I.Q. of 98, some 20 points lower than he had been
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, CONTINUED

Date of Assessment

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY

before. His performance I.Q. was 90, 21 points lower than his previous performance
I.Q., and his full scale I.Q. was 95, which was 22 points lower than his previous
I.Q. score.
We will have a neurological consultation on him and ask the neurologist to also
look at the EEG from the Utah Valley Hospital so we have serial EEG' s. It is my
impression at this point that we are dealing with an organic brain syndrome with
dementia and amnesia problems, which is secondary to cardiac arrest and anoxia to
the brain which was caused by a suicide attempt. It will be interesting to follow
Ron and see how much he improves. Dr. Carlisle will start a neuropsychological
examination on Ron this afternoon.

ROBERT J. HOfcklL, Ph.D.
CLINICAL AND FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
RJH/hh
Dictated:
Typed:
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;TROENCEPHALOGRAM REPORT.INTRODUCTION: This stucjy was performed on a 43 year-old male who has a hypoxic
encephalopathy ceoondary to a suicide attempt by hanging. The patient 1s currently
on Vallum, Dilantin and Morphine.
PROCEDURE: The tracing was obtained using 22 disc electrodes, which were placed
1n the 10-20 International System of measurement» with scalp to scalp and scalp
to ear montages. The patient was not sedated. He was confused and stuporous
throughout the recording.
DESCRIPTION: The background rhythm is made up of a 4Hz theta activity which is
present throughout all deriva tions. There 1s a }c*^ amplitude 25Hz beta activity
present frontally and central ly. When the patient appears to be most arroused, a
12 Hz activity is present in the central regions. This disappears rapidly, however,
add the tracing regains It's baseline frequency previously described. No features
characteristic of stage II si eep were noted during the recording. At times the
tracing slows further and del ta frequencies are noted intermixed with the 4Hz
theta previously described. There were no focal, lateralized or epileptiform
abnotmal16ifcs.
INTERPBETATIBN: This 1s a severely abnormal EEG because of diffuse slowing of the
background frequencies. The characteristics of this tracing are consistent with
a diffuse encephalopathy of metabolic, infectious, traumatic or vascular etiology.
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BRAIN CT:
Unenhanced and enhanced scans she: no significant change since the previous two
studies of 12 November and 29 Deccrber, 1984.
There are no identifiable ar<~:.c cf infarcticn. T..3 enhancing ^essols appear
normal. Itointxapr-rencbT/al or subarachnoid hk~3rrai ~o is present.
EIPREESIC::

ITc-cative brcin scan, uncharged frc^. 2° rcccrber 1984.
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BRAIN CT:
TJnenhanoed and enhanced scans show no significant-change -sinoe the previous two
studies of 12 "Novercber .aad 29 "December * 1984.
There are T*D identifiable areas of infarction. The enhancing vessels appear
normal. No intraparenchymal or subarachnoid hemorrahge is present.
IMPRESSION: Negative brain scan, unchanged ircm 29 December 1984.
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DKHkr/14 Jan

X-Ray Department
Radiologists
n-„-.#~

/~U„JI^-

TUT r \

T-T>

** , ^

»-—.

B

18

UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
PROVO, UTAH
REPORT OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY
LAFFTERY, Ron
02-7724-02
Forensic Security (56)
EEG 85-003
January 14, 1985
This is a thirty-minute recording in the awake 6tate.
EEG DESCRIPTION: The dominant activity in the awake eyes-closed state is
somewhat irregular mixtures of six-to-nine-cycles-per-second theta and
alpha waves. Rhythmic posterior rhythms around eight cycles per second
are frequently present shortly after eye closure. There are no significant inter-hemispheric asymmetries. Drowsiness apparently develops rapidly with eye closure, and the dominant rhythms drop towards six-to-seven-cycles-per-second theta. Stage two did develop following prolonged
drowsiness. Following arousal, the patient's occipital rhythms were
somewhat better organized and slightly faster in frequency. At times
eight-to-nine-cycles-per-second alpha rhythm dominated the rhythm, but
there remained a tendency for intermittent slowing into the seven-oreight-cycles-per-second range. Hyperventilation and photic stimulation
produced no unusual effect. No seizure activity occurred.
EEG INTERPRETATION: The patient's dominant rhythm is slightly disorganized and not as rhythmical as his previous EEG of November 12, 1984.
In addition, the dominant rhythm has slowed at times into the low-normal
or slightly slow range. This suggests the development of a difuse encephalopathy of a mild degree since his previous recording. There are
no localizing features and no epileptiform features.

THOMAS HOUTS, MD
Neurologist
/ea
Dictated 1-23-85
Typed 1-24-85
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DATE OF
CONSULTAT ION

January 23, 1985

CHIEF COMPLAINT
Post-anoxic encephalopathy.
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS
The patient is a 43-year-old white male who attempted 6uicide December 29, 1984. He was
found hanging by the neck without pulse or respiration. He was resuscitated and taken to
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. Notes from that hospital document decerebrate activit;
on admission. He did not wake up until the next day. When he woke up on;December 31, he
was confused without good memory. He was transferred here January 2 with an EEG on that da;
showing difuse slowing in the four-cycles-per-second theta range.
Since arrival here the patient has been observed to be forgetful, although this seems to be
improving somewhat. No seizures have occurred. The patient has no subjective complaints o:
headaches, double vision, or weakness. He does say that he feels a little clumsy or dizzy.
He admits he is forgetful. He thinks his forgetfulness is becoming less and less noticeable
Ee says that since coming here he has noticed a numbness on the left neck and ear area whicl
is improving. He noticed numbness in both hands which is improving and much more limited ii
distribution. It currently involves just the dorsum of his thumb and index finger on both
hands.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
The patient has normal scalp and neck exam.

There is no papilledema.

Mental Status - The patient is alert and oriented to himself, place, and time. He knew it
was approximately the 20th of January but did not know the exact day of the month. The patient speaks fluently without aphasic mistakes. There is no dysarthria. His reading is
somewhat labored, and he did make some paraphrasic substitutions during the paragraph that
he read. He did not read with much retention and later could remember only the general subject of the paragraph rather than any details. He has no trouble with agraphia, and there
is no evidence of motor ataxia in either hand. His memory is somewhat impaired. He remembered only one of three objects at five minutes. He is able to retain memory of recent
major events. He remembers the President's inauguration, the Super Bowl, and the beauty
contest on TV last night, he remembers quite a few details of these events. He still has
poor memory for the events surroudning his return to this hospital. The patient's thought
processes are somewhat more rambling than I remember. His thinking has some paranoid flavoi
When I asked him about his current legal situation, he said that people were trying to advar
their careers by persecuting him. His thought processes appear very egocentric. He says
that society is abrasive to him.
Cranial Nerves - Cranial nerves were unremarkable. Extraoccular movements, pupils, retinal
examination, facial sensation and strength, tongue protrusion, palate elevation, and hearing
were normal.
Motor examination revealed no focal atrophy or weakness.

There was no spasticity or rigidit

Sensory examination revealed subjective decline in sensation to the lateral left neck in the
distribution of several upper cervical roots. He also had subjective sensory loss on the
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dorsum of his hands involving a limited area around the thumb and index finger.
no sensory loss in the lower extremities.

There was

Cerebellar examination revealed no past-pointing or dysmetria. He did have a very subtle
clumsiness on hopping but could do this without loss of balance. He could walk in place
with his eyes closed without turning. Tandem gait was a little effortful and with extra
balancing movements, but he did not lose balance. This appears worse than in November of
1984.
Deep tendon reflexes Tevealed somewhat hypoactive biceps reflexes comapred to his brisk leg
reflexes. Babinski signs were absent. Frontal release signs were absent.
EEG
EEG January 14, 1985, shows a dominant rhythm which is somewhat irregular and slightly slowc
than his previous EEG in November of 1984. The dominant rhythm is now in the seven-to-ninecycles-per-second range. This represents a decline from his normal EEG of November 1984.
It represents an improvement since his EEG report of December 29 with dominant ryhthm at fou
cycles per second. There are no lateralizing features and no epileptiform features.
CT scans have been performed in November of 1984, December of 1984, and January of 1985.
These are all reported as normal and showing no changes.
ASSESSMENT
The patient has post-anoxic encephalopathy. The duration of anoxia was certainly enough to
cause severe difuse cortical dysfunction initially with coma and decerebration. Her has
made substantial improvement but still has evidence of memory impairment. There is also
the possibility of mild frontal-lobe impairment with less judgement. Mild organic changes
in the personality might be expected to exacerbate pre-existing tendencies towards egocentricity, impulsiveness, and lack of judgement. There is also evidence of mild neurological
sequela from his neck injury. He probably developed stretch or contusion of the upper cervical roots bilaterally. This has produced some subtle sensory involvement to the left
neck and hands which is resolving and does not significantly impair his strength or coordination. There is also likely to have been some mild anoxic damage to the cerebellum because
of the new development of mild mid-line cerebellar ataxia.
No specific treatment is available. Progressive improvement in his mental capacities, memory
and balance may continue for three to six months.

THOMAS HOUTS, MD
Neurologist
/ea
Dictated 1-23-85; typed 1-24-85
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Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge
Utah County Building
Prcvc, Utah 846C1
Re:

Rcr.alc Watson Lafferty
Case No. 9509

Dear Judge Bullock:
We are submitting this report on the condition of Ronald Lafferty
as required in your January 28, 1985 Court Order. On January 28, 1985,
Mr. Lafferty was found by the Court to be "not competent to proceed."
Since hospitalized, his treatment has consisted of individual and group
counseling. He has adamently refused treatment with psychotropic medication.
Since our January 22, 1985 report to the Court, the signs of diffuse
organic brain syndrcme which we described have partially resolved and
coincident with that, his personality structure and his demeanor have
come to approximate his condition prior to December 29, 1984. However,
as he has become more lucid and expressive,
the pervasive religiosity
which was present during cur evaluation in November, 1984, has developed
into a religious delusional system which is associated with blurred ecc
boundaries. He is unable to determine the boundaries between hir.se] f and
good and evil spirits and is unable to comprehend that those involved :n
this evaluation, cr the Court processes GO net function within his
delusional system. At this time, we feel that these symptoms are the
result of paranoia. Further symptoms of this disorder include a paranoid
delusional systen which has generalized to include the entire judicial
system, a paranoid pseudo-comm.jni t y involving the legal and social systems,
grandiose denial, a religious martyr complex, and severely impaired ability
to perceive and interpret reality. Although Mr. Lafferty's memory and
recall have improved during this hospitalization, because of his unwillingness to honestly discuss
this, we cannot accurately deterrine to what
extent his memory has returned.
Social Services
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Pace Tvc
Honoral^c J. Robert Bullock
March 19, 1981
Fe: Ronald Watson Lafferty

As to the specific questions surrounding "competency to proceed," our
opinion is as follows:
1)

Does he have a mental illness?

The answer to this is yes. He is suffering from an amnestic syndrome,
secondary to encephalopathy caused by the hanging attempt on December 29,
198A, as well as paranoia.
2) Does he comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him or the
punishment specified for the offenses charged?
While he has a factual understanding ci the proceedings, he does not have
a rational understanding. Our opinion en this question :s no.
2)

Can he assist his counsel in his defense?

Cur opinion on this question is also nc. He is very clear and adament that
he does not intend to use a lawyer in any way. Further, it is our belief
that he does have a mental illness in addition to the amnestic syndrome
that we have already talked about, that of paranoia. His revelation which
adds to the Mosiah Hancock revelation of the 19th Century is certainly
reflective of Messianic grandiosity. Further, he is convinced that the
judicial system and the hospital are in collusion with each other, and
agents of corrupt man-made law. It is really us (including Court) who are
on trial (from God) and not him. Finally, it is impossible for him to see
the inconsistency of his objecting to others infringing on his liberty and
an entitlement from God allowing him tc infringe on the liberty of others.
We believe that Mr. Lafferty cannot cooperate with a lawyer, if he agreed
to representation. He has further made it very clear that he has absolutely
nc intention of cooperating with, or participating in, any Court processes.
Our opinion regarding competency is further confirmed by the "Dusky"
standard (Dusky v. 'Jr.: zee States, 1960) in which the Unted States
S^rrere
COwit ar,T>rcved as a standard for Federal cases as being:
The defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
We believe that Mr. Lafferty does not have the aizility to consult with
a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rationa1 understanding, and does not
have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him.

Face Three
Honors!le J. Robert Pullock
March 19, 1985
Re: Ronald Watson Lafferty

Based on this information, it is our recommendation that the Court
continue Mr. Lafferty's current commitment as. "not competent to proceed."
We further specifically find that:
a)

Mr. Lafferty at this time has a mental illness as defined in
Utah Code Annotated 64-7-28(1),

b)

Because of Mr. Lafferty's mental illness he poses an immediate
physical danger to himself and ethers which includes jeopardizing
his own safety,

c)

Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision
making process regarding the acee;-t tr.ee of rental treatment as
demonstrated by evidence
cf inability tc weigh the possible costs
ar.c benefits of treatment,

d:

There is nc arrroiriate treatrer.t alternative at this tire to
treatment at the Utah State Hospital, and

e)

The Utah State Hospital can provide Mr. Lafferty with treatment,
care, and custody that is adequate and appropriate to his conditions
and needs.

In view of these specific findings, we are respectfully requesting a
Court Order directing the Utah State Hospital to provide Mr. Lafferty with
appropriate medical treatment, including psychotropic medication, which may
include involuntary treatment.

Van 0. Aus t i n , M.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry

i
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

Peter Hcmbecker, M.D.,J.D.
Clinical ar.c Forensic Psychiatry
L

v<. •- ^

.A/:(^-^^

C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D.
Utah State Hospital Clinical

L
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two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of
conspiracy to commit murder; he knows and understands
the penalties prescribed and he knows and understands
that he could be given the death penalty although he
may not believe it will occur, he understands that there
will be a trial, that there will be a judge on the bench,
a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of
criminal charges; knows and understands that he has a
lawyer appointed for him who will undertake to defend
him against those charges; he knows he will be expected,
if he so chooses, to tell his lawyer the circumstances,
to the best of his ability, of the facts surrounding him
at the time and place where the law violations are alleged
to have occurred; he knows that there will be a jury
present to pass upon the evidence adduced as to his guilt
or innocence of such charges; that he has sufficient
mamory of material events that with the aid of memory
reconstruction techniques he can relate these things in
his own personal manner if he chooses to do so.
3. Although the defendant may be operating
within a paranoid delusional system, there is no evidence,
except a suicide attempt, of irrational behavior within
that system or within the system of his religious beliefs.
In fact, his refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or admit
that he is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are
all consistent with his paranoia and any delusional system
pertaining to religion.
4.

Although not requested by the Court to do so,

-8-

the Hospital examiners made findings in their report
dated March 19, 1985, pertaining to matters of involuntary commitment.

For the time being and until a further

hearing in the matter, the Court accepts those findings
as follows:
(a) Mr. Lafferty at this time has a mental illness
as defined in Utah Code Annotated 64-7-28(1)

(However,

such mental illness does not result either in his inability
to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him
or the punishment specified for the offenses charged;
or in his inability to assist counsel in his defense.)
(b) Because of Mr. Laffertyfs mental illness he poses
an immediate physical danger to himself and others which
includes jeopardizing his own safety.
(c) Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a
rational decision making process regarding the acceptance
of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment.
(d) There is no appropriate treatment alternative at
this time to treatment at the Utah State Hospital.
(e) The Utah State Hospital can provide Mr. Lafferty
with treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to his conditions and needs.
OBSERVATIONS
All of the examiners who testified stated that
in their opinion the defendant knew he was in court, that

EXHIBIT 8

Scott M Matheson Governor State of Utah
Norman G Angus. Executive Director

Social Services

November 27, 1984

Honorable J. Robert Bullock
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District
Utah County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
RE:

LAFFERTY, RONALD WATSON
Case No. 9309

Dear Judge Bullock:
We have completed our evaluation of Ronald Watson Lafferty, whom
you committed to this hospital on November 5, 1984 for an evaluation
and a report to the Court as stipulated in the Utah Code Annotated
77-15-3. Our evaluation has consisted of multiple psychiatric interviews, physical examination, psychological assessment, electroencephalogram, computerized tomographic brain scan, neurological evaluation,
review of extensive collateral information, observation of his functioning in the treatment setting and presentation before the clinical staff.
During this evaluation, Mr. Lafferty has been very appropriate and
cooperative, except for a limited willingness to participate in formal
psychological testing. The opinions as set forth below are based on
these facts.
We find that Mr. Lafferty is not mentally ill. His thought
processes, mood, affect, and ability to perceive and interpret reality
are each appropriate. Although he clearly has fundamentalist religious
beliefs and a fervent interest in a strict interpretation of constitutional law, we feel that these do not approach the level of a thought
disorder. He specifically does not meet the diagnostic criteria for
"paranoia" or paranoid schizophrenia. Further, although he does have
paranoid traits, these are associated with his religious beliefs and
are not present to the threshold which is required to meet the diagnostic
criteria for "paranoid personality disorder." There is evidence by
history of the possibility of a bipolar affective disorder, but presently
there are no signs or symptoms compatible with this diagnosis nor have
there been for the past several years.

State Hospital
Seymour P Steed Ed D . Superintendent

I 300 East Center
PO Box 270 Provo Utah 84603-0270
801-373-4400

Page Two
Honorable J. Robert Bullock
November 27, 1984

We find him to be competent to stand trial at this time in that he
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the charges against him and
the punishment specified for the offense charged and has the ability to
assist his counsel in his defense. We specifically find that Mr. Ronald
Lafferty: 1) does not now suffer from a mental disease or defect, 2)
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him
and the punishment specified for the offenses charged, and 3) has the
ability to assist counsel in his defense.
It is our recommendation that he be returned to the jurisdiction of
the Court for further disposition.
Sincerely,

VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist

ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology

PETER HEINBECKER, M.D.
Clinical Director Forensic Psychiatry

JESS GROESBECK, M.D.
Medical Director
hh
Enclosures:

Psychiatric Evaluation
Psychological Evaluation
Social History
Electroencephalogram
CAT Scan
Neurological Evaluation
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IN TOE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PETITION TO DETERMINE
COMPETENCY

Plaintiff
-vsRQNALD WATSON LAFFERTY and
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY,

Case No. 9309

Defendants.

Comes now your petitioner, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy Utah County
Attorney, and files this Petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section
77-15-1 et seq. in order to have the Court determine whether or not defendant
Ronald Watson Lafferty is presently competent to proceed to trial.
This Petition is based on the Affidavit of your petitioner suhxnitted
herewith.
Dated this 2nd day of January, 1985.

WAYNE B^/WATSON
Que£>fleputy County Attorney
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NCftLL T. WOOTTON
UTAii COUNTY ATTORNEY
ROOM 107, OOUNTY BUILDING
PROVO, UTAH 84601
TELEPHONE: 373-5510 ext. 320

IN TOE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH OOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
-vsRONALD WATSON LAFFERTY and
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION TO DETERMINE
COMPETENCY
Case No. 9309

Defendants.

Cones now your affiant, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy Utah County
Attorney, under oath and states as follows:
1. That he is the prosecuting attorney in the above-entitled matter.
2. That upon information and belief he alleges that defendant, Ronald
Watson Lafferty, on Saturday, December 29, 1984, attempted suicide by hanging
himself by the neck at the Utah County Jail.

That there is some question

outstanding as to whether or not defendant Lafferty suffered lack of oxygen to
the brain for a period of time.
3. That your affiant has discussed this incident with defendant's
treating physicians, Dr. A. Tracy Hill and Dr. Allen T. Hunstock.

Based upon

those conversations it is the opinion of your affiant that it would be
appropriate that Ronald Watson Lafferty be recommitted to the Utah State

Hospital for a period of not to exceed 20 days for examination and evaluation in
order to determine whetner or not the reports previously rendered by the
examining doctors are still the same with regard to his:
1. Ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings
against him or the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or
2. His ability to assist counsel in his defense.
4. Your affiant further advises the Court that he is informed by the
treating physicians that the defendant is now ready for immediate release and
transfer to the Utah State Hospital,
Dated this 2nd day of January, 1985.

WAYNE BOtaTSQN
Chief Deputy County Attorney
Subscribed and sworn to before me a Notary Public, this 2nd day of
January, 1985.

Residing at: Utah County, Utah
My Canmission Expires:

3-20-85
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EXHIBIT 10

INSTRUCTION NO.
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The relevant parts of the law of the State of Utah
sets forth aggravating and mitigating factors for your consideration as follows:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1.

"The homicide was committed incident to one

act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during
which two or more persons are killed."
2.

,f

The homicide was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner,
any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture,
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
victim before death.11
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1.

tf

The defendant has no significant history of

prior criminal activity."
2.

"The murder was committed while the defendant

was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. "
3.

"The defendant acted under extreme duress or

under the substantial domination of another person."
4.

"At the time of the murder, the capacity of

the defendant to appreciate the criminal wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements

